



JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-91-009

CONTENTS

23 April 1991

CHINA

Sino-Soviet Border Troop Cut Talks Continue	[XINHUA Apr 5]	1
---	----------------	---

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

MTCR Fourth Plenary Session Meets in Tokyo		2
Delegations From 15 Nations Attend	[KYODO 19 Mar]	2
Delegations Agree To Stem Flow	[KYODO 20 Mar]	2
Meeting Ends in 'Basic Agreement'	[KYODO 20 Mar]	3
Soviet, Japanese Foreign Ministers Discuss Arms Exports, CFE Treaty	[KYODO 29 Mar]	3
Nakayama To Urge PRC on Arms Export Restraint	[KYODO 29 Mar]	4

NORTH KOREA

Northeast Asia as Nuclear Free Zone Viewed	[KCNA 7 Apr]	4
--	--------------	---

SOUTH KOREA

DPRK, Cuba Said To Exchange CW Technology	[CHOSON ILBO 20 Mar]	5
---	----------------------	---

EAST EUROPE

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CFE Signatories Test Inspection Procedures	[CTK 11 Mar]	6
Defense Ministry Gives Briefing on Antichemical Unit	[L. Zumar; Bratislava Radio 13 Mar]	6
Last 12 Soviet Tanks Depart Country	[Prague Radio 27 Mar]	6

HUNGARY

Ministry Update on USSR Troop Withdrawal	[MTI 3 Apr]	6
--	-------------	---

POLAND

Government Holds Position on Troop Withdrawal	[PAP 27 Mar]	6
Storage of Nuclear Warheads at Soviet Installations Reported		7
'Urgent' Tests Ordered	[Warsaw TV 28 Mar]	7
Soviets Agree To Inspection	[Warsaw TV 27 Mar]	7
Polish Official on Plans for Soviet Withdrawal		7
USSR To Withdraw 10,000 Troops This Year	[Z. Ostrowski; Warsaw Radio 4 Apr]	7
Comments on Timetable	[Warsaw TV 4 Apr]	7
Soviet Commander on Plans for Troop Withdrawal		7
Holds Press Conference	[PAP 8 Apr]	7
Confirms Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn	[Warsaw Radio 9 Apr]	8

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

EGYPT

Destruction of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Opposed	[M. Bakri; Paris Radio Monte Carlo 28 Mar]	9
---	--	---

PAKISTAN

- Kashmir Group Says India Using Chemical Weapons [*Islamabad Radio 5 Apr*] 9

SOVIET UNION

GENERAL

- U.S. Attitude on CFE, START, ABM Treaties Criticized [*V. Kozyakov; Moscow Radio 21 Mar*] .. 10
Karpov on Regulating Arms, Technology Trade [*V.P. Karpov; Moscow Radio 2 Apr*] 10
Non-Military Aspects of Security Highlighted [*A. Migolatyev; PRAVDA 3 Apr*] 11
'Collective Will' Needed to Curb Mideast Arms Trade
[*V. Katin; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 3 Apr*] 12
Radio Urges Middle East Arms Supply Cuts [*Moscow International 5 Apr*] 12
Changes in Treaty Negotiation, Ratification Viewed
[*V. Katayev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 27 Mar*] 13

START TALKS

- Churkin on Arms Talks, Gorbachev-Bush Meeting [*V. Churkin; TRUD 29 Mar*] 16

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

- Warner Proposal To Review ABM Treaty Scored [*A. Blinov; IZVESTIYA 22 Mar*] 16
Ladygin: ABM Treaty Review Would 'Totally Wreck' START
[*V. Solovyev; Moscow International 2 Apr*] 17

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

- INF Verification Commission Amends Procedures [*V. Makarchev; TASS 5 Apr*] 17

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

- USSR Said Too Open on Military Data [*B. Tretyakov; ZNAMYA YUNOSTI 15 Mar*] 18
Ladygin Asserts Military Backing for CFE Treaty [*F. Ladygin; Moscow Radio 27 Mar*] 19
General Staff Aide Details Armed Forces Cuts [*F.I. Ladygin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 Mar*] 19
Grinevskiy Assesses Beginning of CFE II Talks [*O. Grinevskiy; Moscow TV 28 Mar*] 20
U.S. Questions Soviet Compliance on Disarmament [*Moscow International 28 Mar*] 20
Karpov on Disputes Over Data Exchange, Naval Units [*V.P. Karpov; Moscow Radio 29 Mar*] 21
U.S. Seen as Uncompromising on Naval Divisions
[*V. Kozyakov; Moscow International 29 Mar*] 23
U.S. Presses for CFE Treaty Concessions [*Ye. Shashkov; PRAVDA 30 Mar*] 24
General Views East Europe Troop Withdrawals [*O. Moskovskiy; TASS 1 Apr*] 25
Ladygin Rejects Charges on Data Exchange, Naval Divisions [*O. Moskovskiy; TASS 4 Apr*] 26
Bush Comment on Settling Differences 'Inspires Hope' [*V. Bogachev; TASS 4 Apr*] 26
Moiseyev on Asymmetrical Cuts, Naval Divisions [*M. Moiseyev; IZVESTIYA 6 Apr*] 27
Military Denies Naval Forces Are CFE Obstacle [*O. Moskovskiy; TASS 8 Apr*] 29
Troop Withdrawal From Poland Begins 9 April [*V. Burbulis; TASS 8 Apr*] 29

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

- Tactical Weapons Cut Urged in Europe [*V. Larionov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 Mar*] 30

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

- Sino-Soviet Talks on Border Troop Cuts Begin [*TASS 5 Apr*] 31
UN Associations View Asian-Pacific Security Problems 31
Conference Opens in Vladivostok [*SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 4 Apr*] 31
Conference Ends [*V. Klementyev; TASS 5 Apr*] 31
Japanese Expectations on Far East Troop Cuts Viewed [*Moscow International 7 Apr*] 32

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

Defense Aide on New Role as Arms Export Controller [G. Renon; *LIBERATION* 23-24 Mar] 33

GERMANY

Liaison Officer on Withdrawal of Soviet Troops [H. Foertsch; *DER MORGEN* 26 Mar] 34

Government Report on Illegal Arms Exports [H. Vielain; *WELT AM SONNTAG* 31 Mar] 35

Details of Ministry Report on Arms Sales to Iraq [DER SPIEGEL 8 Apr] 36

JPRS-TAC-91-009
23 April 1991

CHINA

1

Sino-Soviet Border Troop Cut Talks Continue

*OW0504112791 Beijing XINHUA in English
1043 GMT 5 Apr 91*

[Text] Moscow, April 5 (XINHUA)—The third round of the second stage of Sino-Soviet talks on the reduction of border military forces opened here today.

A Chinese delegation led by Liu Guangzhi arrived here Thursday for the talks.

The Chinese delegation was welcomed at the airport by Genrih Kireev [name as received], head of the Soviet delegation, and others.

JAPAN

MTCR Fourth Plenary Session Meets in Tokyo

Delegations From 15 Nations Attend

OW1903122391 Tokyo KYODO in English 0950 GMT
19 Mar 91

[Text] Tokyo, March 19 (KYODO)—Official delegations from 16 countries met here Tuesday with the aim of tightening controls over missile technology transfers to limit the risks of nuclear proliferation.

The fourth plenary meeting of the missile technology control regime (MTCR), which opened at the Foreign Ministry, was the first major international gathering since the end of the Persian Gulf war related to the issue of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The meeting, expected to end Wednesday, followed a technical session on Monday, at which the 16 member countries cleared up a number of ambiguities in a set of guidelines governing the transfer of sensitive missile technologies, namely those that could contribute to nuclear weapons delivery systems other than manned aircraft.

Japanese officials said that some clauses as they had stood were subject to varied interpretations depending on the individual countries.

They also noted a need for the guidelines to reflect the present postwar situation.

Participants in the plenary session were said to have discussed how to extend the guidelines to countries other than the 16 current members, which include Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States.

Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Norway were participating for the first time.

Questioned on prospects for participation by the Soviet Union and China, officials said that while the nonproliferation guidelines are open for all countries to accept, it is another thing to become a member of the consultative body.

But the officials said that membership for the Soviet Union and China would likely be discussed. They would not elaborate on why they have not been invited to participate to date.

Soviet-made Scud missile systems, employed by Iraq in the Gulf war to strike at Israel and Saudi Arabia, fall among the systems relevant to the guidelines, or those capable of delivering at least a 500 kilogram payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers.

Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Koji Watanabe, who opened the plenary meeting, said, "the very fact that Scud missiles were launched against friendly and

peaceful countries until a fortnight ago ... brings to us once again the urgency of the proliferation issue of mass destruction weapons."

The forum was first established in 1987 by the seven major economic powers who meet annually for summit meetings.

The group's last plenary meeting was held in July 1990 in Ottawa.

Delegations Agree To Stem Flow

OW2003102691 Tokyo KYODO in English 0850 GMT
20 Mar 91

[Text] Tokyo, March 20 (KYODO)—Delegations from 15 Western governments Wednesday agreed to tighten controls over missile technology transfers to limit the risks of weapons of mass destruction proliferating, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials said.

Officials said the two-day meeting on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) ended in agreement on the need to expand the forum's guidelines, which at present only govern the transfer of sensitive missile technologies that could contribute to nuclear weapons' delivery systems.

The forum members issued a joint appeal calling on all countries to adopt MTCR guidelines as they stand "in the light of growing concern over missile proliferation and in the interest of international peace and security."

Participants agreed on a proposal for the next meeting in Washington next autumn that seeks a broadening of the regime's scope to encompass delivery systems for all types of mass destruction weapons, officials said.

This was partly because of concern over the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and delivery systems heightened by the Persian Gulf war, government sources said.

Fifteen out of all the 16 members of the forum sent delegations to the meeting. Luxembourg did not send a delegation, however.

Officials said the delegations discussed the inclusion on the forum of Turkey and several nonparticipating European nations.

The 15 members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and the United States.

The MTCR forum was first established in 1987 by the seven major economies who meet annually for summit meetings. The group's last plenary meeting was held in July 1990 in Ottawa.

Meeting Ends in 'Basic Agreement'

OW2003145491 Tokyo KYODO in English 1215 GMT
20 Mar 91

[Text] Tokyo, March 20 (KYODO)—Delegations from 15 Western governments agreed here Wednesday to tighten export controls in order to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, Foreign Ministry officials said.

Officials said the two-day meeting on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), originally conceived only to halt nuclear proliferation, ended in basic agreement on the need to consider expanding its objectives to stop the spread of chemical and biological weapons.

"There was a common feeling among the participants that in view of this situation there was a need to further strengthen the control of the transfer of missile technologies," explained one official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The MTCR "guidelines" adopted at the forum's first meeting in 1987 only govern the export of sensitive missile technologies that could contribute to nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Officials said the proposal that the scope of the regime be broadened to encompass technologies relevant to all types of weapons of mass destruction was put on the agenda for the forum's next plenary meeting in Washington next fall.

Meanwhile, at Japan's initiative, the forum members issued a joint appeal to nonparticipating countries to adopt the guidelines "in the interest of international peace and security."

One official noted that the fact that major missile exporters like the Soviet Union and China have yet to commit themselves to the guidelines "is a serious flaw for the effective functioning of the MCTR."

Officials said that Japan, as the only Asian country in the forum, would approach China to encourage it to abide by the guidelines. They denied that sanctions were discussed as a form of coercion.

The present forum members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and the United States.

Luxembourg, also a member, did not participate in the Tokyo meeting.

Officials said the delegations discussed the prospects for bringing several other European nations and Turkey into the forum, but would not say whether the possible inclusion of the Soviet Union and China was discussed.

One official said that the Soviet Union and China could conceivably be included in the future "if they really adopt the guidelines and if their export control system is really credible."

The plenary meeting was preceded by sessions of technical experts who proposed modifications of an annex to the MTCR guidelines listing missile-related equipment and technologies subject to export regulations.

"The way the items, both equipment and technology, are described ...are, in the eyes of licensing and enforcing officials, not precise enough," said one official, who added that the vagueness leaves them open to varied interpretations.

The proposed modifications were adopted later in the plenary session, but about half of the items needing clarification were not addressed in Tokyo due to time limitations, officials said.

They said it was decided to hold another technical experts meeting in Paris in May or June and to issue a full revision of the annex by the end of the year.

Officials said that a formal decision at the next meeting in Washington to expand the regime's basic objectives to encompass biological and nuclear weapons would involve a major overhaul of the guidelines and the annex.

The annex of the present guidelines, for example, restricts exports of complete rocket systems and unmanned air vehicle systems capable of delivering at least a 500-kilogram payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers.

But those parameters would have to be lowered if the guidelines are to encompass lighter-weight missiles which can carry chemical and biological warheads over closer distances.

The MTCR forum, originally set up by the seven major industrialized democracies who meet annually for summit meetings, is similar to COCOM, another Western export control regime, in that the details of its proceedings are kept confidential.

The group's last plenary meeting was held in July 1990 in Ottawa.

Soviet, Japanese Foreign Ministers Discuss Arms Exports, CFE Treaty

OW2903143791 Tokyo KYODO in English 1424 GMT
29 Mar 91

[Excerpt] Tokyo, March 29 (KYODO)—The foreign ministers of Japan and the Soviet Union agreed Friday on the need to urgently address the issue of arms exports to the Middle East in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials said.

The agreement was made in the first of two scheduled sessions of formal talks between Soviet and Japanese

Foreign Ministers Aleksander Bessmertnykh and Taro Nakayama in advance of the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit scheduled April 16-19.

In what officials described as a "colorful," yet nonconfrontational two-hour exchange of views with Bessmertnykh, Nakayama reprimanded the Soviet Union for being among the major exporters of arms to Iraq.

He was quoted as saying Moscow must accept responsibility for the consequences of having helped transform Iraq into a hostile regional military power.

Officials said Nakayama called for urgent steps to be taken to halt the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to boost the transparency of conventional weapons transfers, and to promote voluntary restraint on the part of both weapons exporters and importers.

Bessmertnykh told Nakayama that his country was greatly interested in the Japanese foreign minister's call for controls on weapons exports.

"We feel that controls on the arms race are necessary and that they must be implemented in an urgent manner," the Soviet foreign minister was quoted as saying.

Bessmertnykh did not respond directly to the implied charge of complicity that Nakayama leveled at Moscow, saying instead that the problem of arms proliferation in the Middle East must be tackled in a comprehensive manner.

He called for a formula to be devised that would promote self-restraint in weapons transfers, but stressed it must be "acceptable" to exporting and importing countries, officials said.

Bessmertnykh called it paradoxical that the biggest arms suppliers in the Middle East are the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—the Soviet Union, the United States, China, France, and Britain.

Nakayama called for a Soviet explanation of its shift of thousands of weapons and vehicles, including tanks and warplanes, to storage depots east of the Ural Mountains to escape destruction under a European conventional arms treaty [CFE], officials said.

Nakayama told Bessmertnykh that Japan cannot but be concerned if the transfer results in a qualitative upgrading of Soviet forces in the Far East, which he added would be incompatible with the present period of relaxed tensions.

Officials said Bessmertnykh denied that Soviet forces in the Far East have been boosted as a result of the transfers, that Moscow is shirking its international responsibilities, or that it is threatening any country by its actions.

In addition to the transfers, the United States and other signatories to the 21-nation Conventional Forces in Europe agreement (CFE), which was signed in Paris last

fall, have accused Moscow of designating army units as marine units in order to preserve them. [passage omitted]

Nakayama To Urge PRC on Arms Export Restraint

OW2903121491 Tokyo KYODO in English 1204 GMT 29 Mar 91

[Text] Tokyo, March 29 (KYODO)—Japan will ask China to support Tokyo's call for tighter international restraints on arms exports, Foreign Ministry sources said Friday. Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama will make the request in meetings with Chinese leaders during his three-day visit to Beijing starting April 5, the sources said.

Japan is not considering linking economic aid to China with that country's arms exports, however, the sources said.

Officials said Japan has picked arms control and disarmament as its main foreign policy target in the post-Persian Gulf war world.

Japan will call for international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and missiles. It will propose that nations be required to report the sale of conventional weapons to the United Nations, the officials said.

China, one of the world's major weapons suppliers, is known to have sold Silkworm missiles to Iraq.

Premier Li Peng, in a meeting with Japan's International Trade and Industry Minister Eiichi Nakao last week, was negative toward a total ban on arms exports, Japanese officials said. Li told Nakao that China does not agree with the idea of denying smaller countries the right to defend themselves.

NORTH KOREA

Northeast Asia as Nuclear Free Zone Viewed

SK0704113691 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1013 GMT 7 Apr 91

[“Northeast Asia Must Be Turned Into Nuclear Free, Peace Zone”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, April 7 (KCNA)—In order to create a nuclear free, peace zone in the Northeast Asian region, the United States should withdraw all its nuclear weapons and troops from this region and stop all nuclear war maneuvers. At the same time, the United States should give a security commitment not to make nuclear threat to the non-nuclear states.

NODONG SINMUN said this in a signed commentary entitled “The Northeast Asia Should Be Turned Into Nuclear Free Peace Zone” on April 6.

The commentary goes on:

To make Northeast Asia a nuclear free peace zone is a very urgent question to promote the detente process of the international situation as a whole and ensure a durable peace in the world. It is because the danger of a nuclear war is growing in this region as the days go by.

The U.S. imperialists selected just the Northeast Asian region directly linked to the socialist countries as a forward base to check the socialist forces and turned it into a place of confrontation against communism in a bid to hold supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

The U.S. imperialists are attempting to ignite a new war for nuclear attack on our Republic with South Korea as a stepping-stone and to expand the flame to the Northeast Asian region and, furthermore, the world. If a war is ignited by the U.S. imperialists on the Korean peninsula, it will soon turn into a nuclear war, which will inflict nuclear holocaust upon our nation as well as the peoples of Northeast Asia and the world.

Therefore, it is an indispensable requirement to turn the Northeast Asian region into a nuclear free, peace zone.

The key to making the Northeast Asian region a nuclear free, peace zone is to turn the Korean peninsula fraught with the danger of nuclear war into a nuclear free, peace zone.

Unless the Korean peninsula is turned into a nuclear free, peace zone, Northeast Asia cannot be turned into a nuclear free, peace zone under the condition that the U.S. imperialists have converted South Korea into a

nuclear forward base and attempted to unleash a nuclear war with it as a springboard.

Denuclearization and anti-nuclear weapons are the invariable stand of our party and government which consistently pursue peaceloving policy.

Our people will as ever resolutely fight to create a nuclear free, peace zone in this region together with the Northeast Asian people.

SOUTH KOREA

DPRK, Cuba Said To Exchange CW Technology

SK2003033291 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
20 Mar 91 p 2

[Text] The authorities concerned said on 19 March that North Korea appears to have signed a contract with Cuba to export missiles and other antiair weapons.

The authorities also said that a North Korean military delegation, led by Chief of Staff Choe Kwang, signed a military cooperation agreement with Cuba on 10 March and visited a genetic-bioengineering institute, along with the commander in chief of the Cuban Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force, to facilitate exchange of chemical warfare [CW] technology.

The authorities believe that North Korea discussed the purchase of Cuban crude oil and grain during this trip, in view of the fact that when visiting Thailand last November, a North Korean military delegation led by North Korean Minister of People's Forces O Chin-u conducted negotiations to buy rice from Thailand.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CFE Signatories Test Inspection Procedures

AU1303140591 Prague CTK in English 2113 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] Prague, March 11 (CTK)—An international model inspection started here today with a meeting of representatives of 22 signatories to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] which was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990.

The inspection is aimed to check the possibilities of implementation of the treaty's protocol on inspection. Military experts from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary and the United States will tomorrow inspect two Czechoslovak military units in Zatec, North Bohemia. They will proceed to Germany in order to inspect army installations which belong to the Bundeswehr and the U.S. Armed Forces.

Defense Ministry Gives Briefing on Antichemical Unit

LD1303201891 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 13 Mar 91

[Lubomir Zumar report from the Federal Defense Ministry news briefing in Prague]

[Text] The press attache at the Ministry of Defense, Colonel Peter Tax, briefed journalists on the situation in our antichemical unit in the Persian Gulf. The unit is fulfilling tasks of antichemical research. The basic camp has been moved to Kuwait, about 40 km from the capital of Kuwait. The members of the unit are alright. Colonel Tax went on to report on the head count of the Czechoslovak Army. There are 107,125 soldiers in infantry, 23,734 in air defense, and 21,644 in the Army airforce. Altogether, the Czechoslovak Army has 185,721 persons. The realistic fulfillment in the number of professional soldiers is 90 percent, and in soldiers currently in service 70 percent.

Some changes in the protection of classified information in the Czechoslovak Army were mentioned by Colonel Otcenas. In the past two years, there has been reductions in the amount of classified information in the Czechoslovak Army by 60 percent. As from 1 April, for example, journalists will merely need their press card when entering military units.

Deputy Minister of Defense Dr. Antonin Rasek also replied to journalists' questions. Asked whether he advocates the setting up of an independent Slovak state, he said that it is possible, but that the division of the federation would impair the defense ability of the two republics. That is why we should avoid a division of the Army at present.

Last 12 Soviet Tanks Depart Country

LD2703183191 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1500 GMT 27 Mar 91

[Text] The last 12 of the 1,220 tanks originally deployed by the Soviet Army on our territory over the past almost 23 years were loaded up today in the railway station in Milovice in Mlada Boleslav District. Michael Kocab, chairman of the legislative commission supervising Soviet troop withdrawal, stressed that attention will now have to be focused on finalizing the agreement on property rights and financial settlement between the two countries. At the same time he reaffirmed his resolve to surrender his deputy mandate when the last Soviet soldier leaves Czechoslovakia.

HUNGARY

Ministry Update on USSR Troop Withdrawal

LD0304125191 Budapest MTI in English 1135 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 3 (MTI)—Up to now, 80,000 Soviet troops, civilian employees and their family members have been withdrawn from Hungary, while 20,000 are still staying in the country, Lieutenant-Colonel Laszlo Tikos, head of the press department of the Ministry of Defence, told MTI. He added that 20,000 of the 27,000 technical means stationed here previously and over 280,000 tonnes of material had been pulled out from Hungary.

Despite the disputes on accounting, the military units specified in the agreement have been withdrawn from Hungary in due order. By the end of March, 1,039 troop-and material-transporting trains left the country. By June 30, 1991, the deadline for the troops withdrawal, another 251 trains will have to leave the territory of Hungary.

POLAND

Government Holds Position on Troop Withdrawal

LD2703193191 Warsaw PAP in English 1729 GMT 27 Mar 91

[Text] Warsaw, March 27—A government commission for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland at its meeting here today positively evaluated the results of the 5th round of negotiations held on March 19-20 in Moscow.

Poland did not change its position that the transit of Soviet troops going home from Germany via the Polish territory is possible only when there exists a Polish-Soviet agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Poland and a transit agreement.

Storage of Nuclear Warheads at Soviet Installations Reported

'Urgent' Tests Ordered

*LD2803173991 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1615 GMT 28 Mar 91*

[Text] The chairman of the State Atomic Energy Authority has issued an instruction that urgent radiological tests be carried out in the Soviet Army training grounds in Pila voivodship. This is in connection with reports about the possible storage there of nuclear warheads.

Soviets Agree To Inspection

*LD2703215891 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 2055 GMT 27 Mar 91*

[Text] Representatives of Poland and the Soviet Union have held talks concerning the inspection of buildings used by Soviet troops in Poland. The inspections are to ascertain that nuclear arms were not being stored in Poland. General Dubynin reported officially on the agreement of the Soviet Government to such inspections being conducted.

Polish Official on Plans for Soviet Withdrawal

USSR To Withdraw 10,000 Troops This Year

*LD0404164391 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1550 GMT 4 Apr 91*

[Text] The Soviet side has informed us that by the end of this year, it intends to withdraw about 10,000 soldiers from Poland. This is what General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, government plenipotentiary for the stationing of the Soviet Armed Forces in Poland, said at a press conference.

Comments on Timetable

*LD0404194591 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1730 GMT 4 Apr 91*

[Text] Units from the Northern Group of Soviet Forces will be withdrawing from our territory under their own timetable, which has not been agreed with the Polish side. This information was given by General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, government plenipotentiary for the deployment of Soviet Armed Forces in Poland.

By the end of this year, 25 percent of the Soviet Forces will have left Poland. The first to withdraw, on 8 April, will be the Rocket Artillery Unit from [name indistinct], near Szczecinek. The Soviet side foresees the withdrawal of its armed forces from Poland by 1993.

Asked about the transit of Soviet forces from the territory of the former GDR, General Ostrowski answered:

[Begin Ostrowski recording] The transit is taking place, but it is not taking place—this transit of which we now speak. [sentence as heard] What is taking place is a

routine transit which has lasted, well, for 47 years, within the framework of ordinary agreements functioning between the Soviet Union, Poland, and what was then, at the time, the German Democratic Republic. In effect, it had the right to unrestricted transit. Lately, however, we have restricted it quite decisively. We are letting through no more than three or four transports every 24 hours, and no more than 30 to 40 transports every month. [end recording]

There are about 52,000 Soviet soldiers on Polish territory at the present time. Their armaments amount to 590 tanks, 800 personnel carriers, 201 planes, and 40 helicopters.

Soviet Commander on Plans for Troop Withdrawal

Holds Press Conference

*LD0904021991 Warsaw PAP in English 2039 GMT
8 Apr 91*

[Text] Koszalin, April 8 (PAP)—10,000 Soviet soldiers, that is, about 30 military units, including a missile unit, some aircraft, communication and engineering units as well as single tank and artillery units, will leave Poland by the end of 1991, the commander of Soviet troops in Poland, General Viktor Dubynin, told a press conference held in the Soviet garrison of Borne-Sulinowo (the Koszalin Voivodship, north-west Poland) today.

The missile unit will start its withdrawal from the Borne-Sulinowo garrison tomorrow, he said.

General Dubynin said the Soviet side would hand over to the Polish side 7 Soviet garrisons situated in Poland and added that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland was to be completed by the end of 1993. In 1994 some 2,000 Soviet soldiers will remain in Poland to secure the transit of Soviet troops from Germany which is to be completed in 1994.

"The beginning of the withdrawal of the missile unit from the Borne-Sulinowo garrison starts a process of a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland," Dubynin said.

"Even if the Polish Government did not ask us to withdraw our troops we would start a planned withdrawal this spring, as we are of the opinion that Soviet troops should not be stationed in foreign states," he added.

General Dubynin said the beginning of the withdrawal was agreed with the Polish Government.

But General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, a Polish Government plenipotentiary for the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland, who also attended the conference, said it was a one-sided action as the Polish side did not receive a time-table of the withdrawal in 1991. "But we receive the beginning of the withdrawal with satisfaction," he said.

General Dubynin said a faster withdrawal of Soviet troops was unrealistic due to material and technical reserves they have in Poland. He also stressed there were about 200,000 military families in the USSR without apartments. A faster withdrawal from Poland would increase their number and we expect the issue will be settled till the end of 1993, added he. [sentence as received]

General Ostrowski did not agree with these statements. He recalled the Polish side was ready to keep a definite number of such families till the problem was solved and added that Polish construction enterprises operating in the USSR were ready to provide construction services.

As far as reserves were concerned, General Ostrowski stressed the Polish side could supply a necessary number of trains.

Asked on the future of units that would leave Poland, General Dubynin said the missile unit would be dissolved by the end of June on the territory of the Soviet Union. Some units will be dissolved and some will be sent to various military districts, he added.

General Dubynin stated there were no Soviet chemical weapons in Poland. In April the Polish side will control two Soviet garrisons to confirm the fact. Nuclear weapons were taken to the Soviet Union in the first half of 1990, he said.

Confirms Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn

LD0904075291 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
0600 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] An important matter at the center of attention in today's papers is the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland. The papers carry reports on a news conference by General Viktor Dubynin, commander of the Soviet Forces Northern Group.

To the question from RZECZPOSPOLITA on whether he can unambiguously and authoritatively contradict that chemical and nuclear weapons are now or have in the past been located on Polish territory, the Soviet general replied: I firmly state that there are not and have not been chemical weapons in Poland. In accordance with Poland's wishes, in April there will be an unannounced inspection of (two) Soviet units. We can make more of our units available for inspections. As to nuclear weapons, as there were missile units then there were also nuclear weapons. All of the nuclear weapons were transported out of Poland in the first half of 1990. This is, stresses RZECZPOSPOLITA, the first public Soviet statement confirming the existence in the past of nuclear weapons on Polish territory, in bunkers near Pniewo, which is only a few kilometers from Borne-Sulinowo where ceremonies associated with the withdrawal of a Soviet missile unit will take place today. The title of the article is: There Were Nuclear Weapons in Our Country.

EGYPT

Destruction of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Opposed

*NC2803130391 Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic
1200 GMT 28 Mar 91*

[Report by Mustafa Bakri in Cairo]

[Text] Our radio has learned from high-level political sources that Egypt has officially informed Washington that it rejects the U.S. condition contained in the draft UN Security Council resolution that Iraq should destroy all its chemical and biological weapons before a final cease-fire can be established in the Gulf.

Egypt has explained that the destruction of these weapons would be a serious precedent at a time when Israel stubbornly refuses to submit its nuclear installations to international inspection. Egypt has stressed that the best way to avert an arms race in the region is to adhere to President Mubarak's initiative calling for the removal of weapons of mass destruction from every state in the region and for the application of this principle to all parties in the Middle East.

PAKISTAN

Kashmir Group Says India Using Chemical Weapons

*BK0504094091 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu
0200 GMT 5 Apr 91*

[Text] The Majlis-i-Amal Kashmir [Kashmir Action Council] has drawn the attention of world leaders and the UN secretary general to the increasing atrocities by Indian forces in occupied Kashmir. In separate telegrams addressed to heads of state and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the Majlis-i-Amal has said that the use of chemical weapons is yet another addition to the list of India's heinous crimes in Kashmir. The Majlis-i-Amal has alleged that the international media, the Red Cross, and Amnesty International representatives are not being allowed to enter occupied Kashmir, and that Indian atrocities have forced about 100,000 Kashmiris to leave their homes and hearths. The Majlis-i-Amal has urged the world body and major powers to take notice of the large-scale violation of human rights in occupied Kashmir and save the region from destruction.

GENERAL**U.S. Attitude on CFE, START, ABM Treaties Criticized***LD2203060991 Moscow World Service
in English 2300 GMT 21 Mar 91*

[Text] At the recent talks in Moscow involving Secretary of State James Baker, our two nations reaffirmed loyalty to cooperation but failed to achieve progress in arms control. Vladislav Kozyakov explains why.

The Gulf war naturally detracted attention from arms control, but the crisis is over and the key aspect of international politics, this barometer of Soviet-U.S. relations, must win priority once again. All the more so, cooperation between Moscow and Washington to counter Iraqi aggression stood out when the United Nations was adopting its decisions. Washington officials have admitted no victory could be won in the Gulf without Soviet support.

Why then have the talks lost some of their pace to complete a treaty that would cut in half strategic offensive weapons [START]? The Americans claim the differences of interpreting a treaty for conventional arms in Europe [CFE] keep the administration from sending this treaty to the Senate for ratification and they claim that without ironing out these differences first the United States cannot sign the START treaty either. Paradoxically, at Secretary Baker's Moscow talks, the United States refused to compromise to give the conventional arms treaty the green light. It believes the three Soviet Coast Guards divisions attached to the navy are ground troops liable for cuts. The LOS ANGELES TIMES reported the Soviets had offered to cut in half the number of weapons they want exempt from treaty regulations. American papers also quoted a U.S. official as admitting that this country had made genuine efforts to try and resolve it, but Washington rejected the Soviet compromise proposals all the same.

When the other side at talks refuses to seek agreement through concessions the only feeling this can give is bewilderment. What is the cause of obstinacy? Aren't there any unknown motives behind this? Incidentally questions of this kind regarding the U.S. position are prompted by the current discussions in America. Various programs are considered to build up weapons. Besides the [word indistinct] ABM treaty has again become unsuitable at this particular time. With the administration's participation Senator Warner's amendment has been prepared to have talks to reconsider this treaty, a treaty that stands in the way of development of space weapons.

America is making a lot of statements at various levels about its leading role in the world, about a one pole world that came into being after the Gulf war and about the United States to have become the world's only superpower. The WASHINGTON POST claims the White House no longer sees the START treaty as the

great symbol of security it seemed in the past. Is the obstinacy of American diplomats to conventional and nuclear arms control talks behind the change of feelings among U.S. policymakers?

Karpov on Regulating Arms, Technology Trade*LD0304083691 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program
Radio-1 Network in Russian 1140 GMT 2 Apr 91*

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Pavlovich Karpov by diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Pasko; place and date not given; from the program, "This Is What Is Being Spoken About" hosted by Yevgeniy Grachev]

[Text] [Grachev] One of the issues that has been the focus of our public's attention in recent months has been the arms trade. The Persian Gulf crisis showed quite obviously the threat that lies within the uncontrolled sales of arms. It has to be said that wide discussion on this problem has also been taking place in the West, in France, the FRG, Italy, the United States, and Canada. In Germany penalties for avoiding the relevant laws have been toughened up. Detailed, exhaustive information about arms sales has been published in Canada. This subject has also become a topic of discussion at international meetings and talks. Fifteen Western countries have decided to extend and reinforce the rules governing the trade in technology used in the manufacture of various types of combat missiles.

What is our country's position on this question? This is not just a matter of idle interest. During the last five-year plan period we supplied armaments and military equipment worth more than 56,000 million rubles to overseas countries, although for us the arms trade has until now, at least, been political rather than commercial in character: first and foremost it has been a question of allies and developing countries. Nevertheless, Iraq's aggression has shown that those who receive our arms are able to use them not just for purposes of defense.

My colleague, All-Union Radio diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Pasko, has discussed all of this with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Pavlovich Karpov. I think you, too, will be interested in hearing his opinion:

[Begin Karpov recording] I have to say that we are in favor of questions concerning the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the first place and also questions connected with the sale of conventional weapons becoming the subject of serious consideration in the international community. The Soviet-U.S. declaration on the nonproliferation of various types of weapons was adopted during the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting at the end of May and in June last year. In it both the United States and the Soviet Union undertook to work together in this direction.

In our view, the war in the Persian Gulf showed that solutions excluding not merely the proliferation of missile and nuclear armaments and chemical weapons but

limiting to the maximum extent possible the sale of supply of conventional weapons, and first and foremost weapons used for offensive purposes, are of increasing interest. We are in favor of these issues being resolved on an international footing. Even last year we proposed that a kind of arms sales register be set up at the United Nations as a kind of information base to see the whole picture of arms supplies in the world and to draw attention to dangerous concentrations of armaments being formed in particular regions and, on the basis of this, to discuss questions connected with restricting arms deliveries and regulating these deliveries.

In light of the experience of the war in the Persian Gulf we are in favor now of these questions being regarded as most urgent issues and becoming the subject of discussion. We have expressed ourselves and do express ourselves in contacts with the United States, Great Britain, and other countries that are the main producers of weapons. For example it is no secret that at least 80 percent of Iraq's armaments came from the five countries that are permanent members of the Security Council. It is paradoxical, but it is a fact. These countries, therefore, must of course assume first and foremost responsibility for resolving issues of the nonproliferation of armaments throughout the world.

As regards the issue of missile armaments and rocket technology, the Soviet Union advocates order being introduced here, too, of a single set of conditions being established for limiting the proliferation of military rocket technology, and also of not creating artificial obstacles for the development of rocket technology that could be used for peaceful purposes, space research, probing the upper layers of the atmosphere, that is, weather forecasting and research into atmospheric manifestations, which makes it possible to make long-term weather forecasts and predictions of climatic change, and so forth. We are in favor of the creation of a worldwide cooperation system guaranteeing access by all countries, irrespective of their financial circumstances, to these achievements of world rocket technology and space research and in other peaceful uses of this technology, while placing definite obstacles in the way of creating missiles to strengthen the military potential of particular countries. In this sphere we are carrying out work, we are carrying out work first and foremost with countries which are producers of rockets which have solid experience of working with rocket technology, and also with countries which would like to obtain rockets and technology for space research.

So here joint efforts are obviously needed by all countries, and the creation of some new kind of system, a kind of International Atomic Energy Agency for space, say, along the lines of a space IAEA, which would guarantee access to rocket technology for peaceful purposes and which would close the door to the proliferation of military rocket technology. [end recording]

Non-Military Aspects of Security Highlighted

PM0504145591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Apr 91 Second Edition p 4

["Viewpoint" article by Professor Aleksandr Migolatyev: "Security Paradoxes"]

[Text] I think many people will agree that the appearance of nuclear weapons and modern delivery systems—particularly strategic systems—was a decisive factor in changing people's views of international, regional, and national security. There are more of all sorts of weapons in the world, but less security. Has this been recognized by everyone? States have been striving for decades to strengthen their position by means of the arms race and a demonstration of their military superiority. As a result, mankind, having amassed "mountains of weaponry," has become hostage to them. Collective efforts to seek peace have been systematically undermined by paroxysms of violence.

The paradoxes of security have primarily affected the world's strongest powers: the USSR and the United States. By the mid-eighties they had amassed an inconceivable strategic nuclear megatonnage of 11.3 billion tonnes of explosive—more than 2 tonnes for each person on earth. What was the result? Both countries acquired many times over the potential for MAD—mutually assured destruction. And precisely as a consequence of this, their security in nuclear-missile terms was not assured. Indeed, can peaceful, safe development be considered to be assured if weapons capable of wiping out all life on the face of the earth are in existence?

Security cannot be reduced to military factors. That is essentially axiomatic. But how far off is the time when we will finally be able to say a farewell to arms! Today, in my view, only irresponsible politickers or anti-Army circles could advocate that there be no limits to the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces' might, or call the Soviet defense complex "monstrous." In today's over-armed world, not having your own army would be tantamount to signing your own death warrant.

The Gulf War and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact's military organization converged from different directions to focus on a single point: NATO. Indeed, virtually all the allies in that bloc joined the United States in opposing Iraq. The troops and naval forces of the NATO alliance made up the backbone of the multinational forces in the anti-Iraq coalition. Primarily NATO weapons—mainly U.S., British, and French weapons—were used. And although the NATO leadership did not make a decision to go to war (each state within the bloc took part in the war on the basis of national decisions), there is no doubt about the synchronized nature of the allies' actions, which made their military contingents subordinate to the commanding general, N. Schwarzkopf.

For many years the Western side in Europe held forth about a united, nonbloc, all-European security system. But when the Warsaw Pact took that path, NATO

engaged in a rapid "restructuring." First, North Atlantic circles immediately stated that NATO was not planning to disband and would continue its activities. Second, it was asserted that the NATO bloc itself, not the Helsinki process, should become the main European security system. Bearing in mind that NATO's nuclear deterrence strategy remains in force, how should the Soviet Union react to all this? In what direction will the USSR's priority relations with the United States—the leading country in the Western military-political alliance—develop? The fundamental vital interests of the two countries and the international community as a whole require that these relations be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

It is also clear that many new aspects have emerged in the USSR's geopolitical, military-strategic, and domestic situation. The circumstances obviously demand difficult measures commensurate with the situation in the security sphere and corresponding to the amendment of the country's positions in the disarmament sphere. I think, however, that the frightening incantations about the unilateral abolition of Warsaw Pact military structures and the development of disarmament processes hardly deserve any serious attention. I am sure that life will show that our former allies have created far more problems for themselves than they have for the Soviet Union.

May I be so bold as to put forward the following recommendation: We should not rush into signing bilateral military agreements with former Warsaw Pact members. Time will tell just what the contents of such agreements (treaties) should be, and when, with whom, and on what basis they should be concluded.

There is one other point which I cannot fail to mention. Unfortunately we have many politicians, academics, deputies, and specialists in our country who pay lip service to sovereignty and independence but actually ignore the internal aspects—unrelated to military might—of national security, without which state sovereignty is no more than a phantom or a myth. Reliable security is impossible without a highly effective and integrated economy, without advanced science, information, hardware, and technology, outside of a renewed unified USSR, without democratic change, social strength, and political stability in society, without sound moral foundations for the people, and without high conscientiousness and discipline among the masses.

It is only in a dialectical combination of these components and elements of security that we will be able to ensure favorable prerequisites for solving our difficult problems—both now and in the future.

'Collective Will' Needed to Curb Mideast Arms Trade

PM0504135991 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA:
in Russian 3 Apr 91 First Edition p 5

[IAN correspondent V. Katin report for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "The Arms Trade: Fair of Military Vain-glory"]

[Excerpts] Luxembourg—The Persian Gulf War has died down and now the same Western diplomats who failed to prevent it are busy imposing a "new order" in the Near and Middle East. It is being specifically proposed that a permanent organ—a conference on security and cooperation along the lines of the all-European one—be created.

The drafts and plans for postwar reorganization contain what I consider a sensible idea: To block the mass sale of modern types of weapons to the highly explosive region. Some politicians are going further, proposing that all output produced by the manufacturers of death be subjected to rigorous international control. There are more than enough arguments for this. As the Iraq-Iran war and the Iraq-Kuwait conflict have shown, these tragedies might not have happened without the mountains of arms obtained abroad. "Who, may I ask, supplied Saddam Husayn with the rope with which he wanted to hang us?", the famous French political scientist T. de Montbrial, asks. [passage omitted]

The story with Iraq is a classic example of this: Frequently the very same firms supplied arms to both warring sides. National legislators in individual states cannot introduce effective bans, because all kinds of indulgences and loopholes would inevitably appear. What is needed here is rather a collective will, like the will the United Nations demonstrated in adopting resolutions and sanctions against Iraq. The 30 states participating in the anti-Iraq coalition also displayed enviable will and determination when they attacked this long-suffering country en masse. Therefore we could also make joint efforts to try and break this vicious circle of the arms race in which our planet has found itself.

Let me remind readers that in 1977-1978 the USSR and the United States held talks on the reduction of arms sales to third countries and a certain mutual understanding was even reached. However, the Americans broke off the talks and, having thought about it for three whole years, declared that supplies of means of warfare are "an integral component of their foreign policy, capable of demonstrating strength." Now is perhaps the time to revert to this topic in Soviet-U.S. relations.

Radio Urges Middle East Arms Supply Cuts

LD0504163791 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 5 Apr 91

[Text] On 4 April President Gorbachev had a talk with the Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq Shar'. The talk covered, among other issues, problems of a postwar settlement in the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East as a whole. The two sides underlined that if a genuine settlement and peace were to be achieved, a military relaxation had to be brought about. Yuriy Solton elaborates:

The resolution just adopted by the United Nations Security Council provides for an actual dismantling of the Iraqi huge military machine. It urges Iraq to destroy, under the United Nations supervision, the entire stock of

its bacteriological and chemical weapons and also its ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km. Baghdad is banned to buy or develop nuclear weapons.

The resolution also reaffirms a ban on the deliveries of any weapons to Iraq from the outside. It means that Iraq, which scared its neighbors, fought against Iran and captured Kuwait, will cease to exist as a powerful militaristic state in the region. Consequently a hotbed of tension and military danger will be closed.

But other hotbeds are still there. The main is the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the Palestinian question lying at its core. There are quite a few differences between Arab countries that also lead armed clashes [as heard]. It is an open secret that tension in that region that resulted, apart from small conflicts, in eight major wars was fed on the supplies of weapons from the outside. These weapons were coming from the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and China. The Soviet Union, too, sent its impressive consignment to the region.

The Gulf war, however, has revealed that Iraq is not the only country in the region that should be demilitarized. All agree that this should be done in relation to Iraq. But there have appeared other alarming facts. Israel, for example, gets from the United States more than half a billion dollars to meet its military needs. Saudi Arabia was promised part of the heavy weapons that the United States had moved to the region in view of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. There is a plan to sell \$1.6 billion worth of arms, including combat planes, to Egypt. Forty attack aircraft of the F4-E class have already arrived in Turkey as part of the package of American military assistance. No restraint is shown by other suppliers of weapons to the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Does this all mean that the arms race and the military confrontation will continue?

Moscow believes that there is a need to consider in earnest balanced and reduced weapons deliveries to the region. Restraint should be shown first and foremost in relation to offensive weapons, particularly missiles and missile technology. All kinds of mass destruction weapons should be prevented from spreading in that region. A zone free from them should be set up there. After all, all the Middle East countries have joined in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and also in a convention banning chemical weapons now in a state of preparation.

Changes in Treaty Negotiation, Ratification Viewed

PM0204135791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 27 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by V. Katayev, member of the Interdepartmental Working Party on Questions of Arms Limitation: "Those Hampering The Maintenance of Parity: Nuclear Games and Nuclear Charges"]

[Text] In our country the public receives extremely meager information about the disarmament processes. A real information "black hole" has developed here, although the Soviet Union is now simultaneously conducting several talks. The most important are on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms, on space armaments, the preparation of multilateral conventions banning chemical weapons, and reducing arms in the Soviet-Chinese border area. A range of disarmament questions are being examined at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The specialists engaged in studying the relevant questions at the talks are under a constant heavy workload. They only have time to occasionally grumble at the appearance of another inept article in the press. Meanwhile there are more than enough cocktail party opinions and wrangling by perfectly estimable people on the pages of popular magazines and newspaper on the topic of "Why do we have so many weapons and generals?" Newspapers have also frequently carried articles by ordinary people: When will you explain to us—not the academicians and generals—what you are doing at the talks without confusing us with figures that even a specialist has trouble fathoming?

This is particularly important because the good old practice of "rubberstamping" will no longer apply when ratifying the treaty on strategic offensive arms and other treaties in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The fate of the treaty will in fact depend upon the depth of understanding of the problem shown by deputies who are at present remote from the vicissitudes of the treaty and will have to grasp quickly what our country's highly skilled specialists have been poring over for years.

Figures are, of course, important. But do figures give the whole picture? In the last five years much has changed in the actual approaches to questions of arms limitation. An efficient system has been established in the daily, multidimensional work carried out in this area. It is based on a balance of interests of all ministries and departments—directly involved or not—and the collective labor of the military, diplomats, designers, scientists, lawyers, and ecologists. The art of arranging the military policy mosaic has shifted from one-man cells to the forum of the professionals. The leadership has begun to trust specialists and to heed their prescriptions. New forces have also become involved in working out disarmament problems with their own ideas and thinking.

In this period of great insight and scaling of new foreign policy heights, what is now called "new political thinking," nuclear disarmament has been the main priority, but at the same time there has been no letup in argument about the level of nuclear charges necessary and sufficient to deter aggression, how many nuclear charges could be employed in a first nuclear strike, and how many are necessary for a counterstrike. There are calculations available for all these options.

At the same time life has shown that theoretical nuclear games are remote from reality. Nuclear charges are not the only determinant of a country's security. Quite new

economic and domestic policy components of it have appeared. Clearly a new, wiser, and more complex mathematics is now needed here. Military theoreticians alone are not enough any more to tackle this task, and it is beyond the powers of the narrow circle of military specialists.

The first results of nuclear disarmament are at hand—the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is in operation. The USSR and the United States have begun cutting intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles under the commitments assumed in 1987. As of this 1 March we have eliminated 1,794 such missiles (97.2 percent) and the United States 752 (88.9 percent). The elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles continues.

Work on the Soviet-U.S. supertreaty on cutting strategic offensive arms is making difficult headway. History has not known such a treaty before. The contracting parties have complicated its technical aspects to such an extent that the serious question arises: Won't we have to open subsequent talks, regarding its implementation. A number of outstanding issues still have to be resolved before the planned signing of the treaty in the first half of the current year. Will these questions not fly like moths to the light because of the abundance of time spent? [sentence as published]

Movement has begun regarding another another major disarmament process—the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. After all, we and the NATO countries have more than 10,000 charges. Progress here will depend on the results of the strategic offensive arms talks.

Problems of armaments have always been tackled one way—by catching up with or, even better, overtaking potential adversaries both qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, the 1941 syndrome became very persistent for us. The state of the race became our customary way of thinking and acting. It was considered that weapons could not be superfluous. There could only be an insufficiency of them.

We overloaded the economy but thereby created the parity enabling us to embark on arms reduction talks. Without parity there would have been no talks. Unfortunately, there is another side to the coin here—the constant forging of weapons became an end in itself, a spontaneous requirement of not just the Army but industry too (and not just in our country). We were fearful of losing technology and quality. We pursued gross output. We transformed valuable manpower and material resources into piles of missiles and thousands of tanks. For parity and sometimes going beyond parity. We constructed arsenals for weapons instead of the accommodation so sorely needed by the Army.

Having passed the peak of weapons saturation, we are now destroying those weapons. With great difficulty. We are destroying more because we stockpiled more. Humanity is still only just learning to destroy weapons.

They have accumulated from war to war and have been destroyed only in the process of combat operations.

The implementation of the Soviet-U.S. agreement eliminating chemical weapons, for example, has turned into a major socioeconomic problem in our country. We have to decide what is to be done with obsolete conventional munitions. The lifetime of a weapon is short and it will expire all the same—whether there is a treaty or not.

The Soviet-U.S. talks on reducing and limiting strategic armaments under way in Geneva form only part, albeit a very important part, of a disarmament process affecting the interests of everyone in the world. It is symbolic that the two states with the most powerful nuclear arsenals have become the main initiators of the disarmament process. They have demonstrated not only their high technical expertise in creating instruments of death but have also proven equal to the task of understanding mankind's concern. And they went further. Back in 1989 at the Conference on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Geneva our delegation advanced for the first time jointly with the Americans the idea, for the time being only on the political plane, that the disarmament process needs to be globalized. This position was supported by virtually all participants in the conference. By then the American delegate no longer found it possible to adopt the traditional rigid stance on the question of a complete nuclear weapons test ban.

However, despite the Americans' public acknowledgment of the advent of the "postconfrontational" period, the U.S. Administration is still extremely slow to put its rhetorical statements and overassessment of strategic priorities and security threats onto a practical footing. U.S. military thinking is patently failing to keep pace with the political changes. The politicians are trying to build a structure of treaties on the basis of compromises between the administration and the Defense Department. These compromises are reflected in the military's dragging its consent to the dismantling of the war machine.

It is planned in this context, for example, to further develop nuclear production capacities. This was stated in a report prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy on the grounds that nuclear weapons will remain for the visible future, albeit reduced in number.

The military budget mirrors the process. The draft budget for fiscal 1992 (\$298.2 billion) envisages a military expenditure cut of just 1 percent compared with the current year, and 3 percent annually thereafter. The pessimist will say—too little! The optimist will say—okay, the process has started and is going in the right direction!

At the same time in fiscal 1992 it is planned to purchase four B-2 heavy strategic bombers (almost \$5 billion), to carry out the trial stage of the rail-mobile MX ("Peacekeeper") strategic missile with the commissioning of its rail-mounted launcher, and to continue developing the

new "Midgetman" strategic missile and the production of sea-launched Trident-2 strategic missiles.

The strategic defense initiative (SDI) is still keeping afloat. There are shifts taking place here. Burgeoning realism has begun to make headway. But the program at present is only developing in the area of "repulsing an unsanctioned or accidental launch or an attack by a third party."

It would also be worthwhile our noting the following aspect of the American budget: It asks for almost half a billion dollars to implement the arms control treaties and agreements. We will also have to spend tens and hundreds of millions of rubles on specific disarmament work before reaping the conversion dividend.

We are now seeking to proceed on the basis of our minimal weapons requirements. For the "negotiators" the Soviet doctrine of reasonable sufficiency is no empty slogan but serves as a guide to action. Unfortunately, for the present this basically applies only to the Soviet side. It may be recalled that Jimmy Carter's "Presidential Directive 59," that envisages the possibility of the United States waging "limited nuclear war" against the Soviet Union, will have its 10th birthday this September. The directive has still not been countermanded. It is with cause that an American diplomat once complain that you in the USSR have perestroika going on while we in the United States are still in the Brezhnev era.

That remark is pertinent not just in respect of the United States. Last year's meeting of the leaders of NATO countries in London demonstrated assiduous running on the spot, where the tread is audible but there is no movement. While recognizing publicly that nuclear weapons can only be resorted to in the most extreme case and moving away from the "flexible response doctrine" NATO members nevertheless sought to duck specific questions about their participation in nuclear disarmament.

Everything is not so simple here. For example, the British will be carrying out a kind of strategic nuclear weapons revival at sea—fitting nuclear submarines with new Trident-2 missiles, purchased from the United States. From 1964 [as published] there will be 512 nuclear charges on British submarines instead of 384. There's disarmament for you! The English proverb "You can't have your cake and eat it too" inevitably springs to mind here..

The French continue to jealously protect their nuclear prerogatives. While talking about their nonparticipation in NATO military structures they actively intervene in all discussions on European nuclear affairs with the aim of fixing the independent position of their "strike forces." Possessing, like the United States, a nuclear triad (land-, sea-, and air-based forces—452 charges in all) and plans to improve it, the French with its firm, old-fashioned nuclear commitments could gradually come to bar the way to further nuclear disarmament by

their NATO bloc allies. This should become particularly apparent as we approach the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

France's static nuclear policy since back in the seventies has denied it the opportunity to occupy a proper leading place in East-West dialogue. France did not use the opportunity afforded this time at the NATO summit meeting in London either. In London NATO again stated that nuclear weapons should remain a means of diplomatic pressure to prevent a conflict degenerating into a military clash.

There is another major task here. At the present neither the United States nor NATO are limiting nuclear or other armaments at sea.

True, the Americans have announced the Navy's transition to a nonoffensive concept.

As studies by American and Soviet experts show, U.S. interests could be adequately met by a navy half the size.

Recently the Americans have stepped up their activity in the area of creating nonnuclear strategic weapons (cruise missiles and heavy bombers). On 9 February they carried out over Canadian territory the second test this year of a cruise missile launched from a B-52 heavy bomber. The events in the Persian Gulf have shown the high accuracy of cruise missiles. But where might that lead? After all, decisionmaking regarding the use of nonnuclear weapons is easier, but the systems that give warning of missile attack are unable to distinguish nonnuclear missiles and planes from nuclear ones. A dangerous syndrome which one might call the "pseudonuclear strike" is emerging.

Unfortunately, nuclear weapons, although they are now more a political bogey, will clearly exist until aggression ends. Their complete elimination, like the elimination of plague, cancer, and AIDS, is a very important task for mankind.

In terms of nuclear forces we have parity with the United States and plan cuts only in the area of superfluous charges. Both sides know the other's potential (military specialists have even visited that holy of holies—the launchers of the latest strategic missiles). They know that a nuclear attack will lead to a nuclear response unacceptable and destructive to the aggressor. This state will also be maintained after the 50-percent (actually, roughly 30-percent) reduction in strategic offensive armaments. It should also remain after possible subsequent cuts in strategic arms, talks will be held thereafter.

But the nuclear powder-kegs are still not empty and we are forced to keep the powder dry.

START TALKS

Churkin on Arms Talks, Gorbachev-Bush Meeting

PM2803221991 Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Mar 91
p 3

[Interview with Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, by correspondent E. Alekseyev; no place or date given: "When Will the Gorbachev-Bush Meeting Take Place?"]

[Text] [Alekseyev] Following the ceasefire in the Persian Gulf, it is believed that the main issue that is holding up the meeting between President M. Gorbachev and President G. Bush is the incomplete agreement on certain points in the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments [START]. It has been reported that it is more than 90 percent completed. Is there no agreement yet on the remaining questions?

[Churkin] One might even say that the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments is 98 percent complete. But, as has happened in the past at talks on arms reductions, the final step is very difficult, although all the really fundamental treaty provisions were pretty well settled long ago. The issues participants still have to do some work on include certain aspects of verification and some inspection procedures, in particular the continuous observation of production facilities, questions of access to telemetric information and the "reduced war-head count" for ballistic missiles, and some details connected with heavy bombers. I think it is clear from this list that these are highly technical matters requiring painstaking work by experts. Both the Soviet and the U.S. sides attach special significance to the treaty on strategic offensive armaments and want everything to be carefully worked out, down to the smallest detail. It must be borne in mind that, to all appearances, this large (around 700 pages) and complex document faces a difficult ratification process both here and in the United States.

[Alekseyev] Some people in the West claim that the delay is also due to the fact that first all questions concerning conventional armaments must be tackled once and for all. However, the Soviet Union has apparently put forward some new conditions making it difficult to reach an agreement.

[Churkin] We are not establishing any linkage between questions of conventional arms reduction and the strategic offensive armaments treaty. Although, I believe it cannot be ruled out that the difficulties that have arisen in the conventional arms sphere have caused some "sluggishness" on the part of the U.S. participants in the strategic offensive armaments talks, which their Soviet colleagues sometimes complain about. As for conventional armaments, it is not a matter of our having put forward certain conditions (this has not happened); the point is that a number of countries that signed with us in Paris the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe are now questioning us about

data on categories of armaments that the sides exchanged before the signing.

Recently this concern has been manifested during the discussion of these questions at the political level, in particular during the recent visits to Moscow by the U.S. secretary of state and the German and British foreign ministers. We put forward some ideas that, in our view, are a suitable key to the solution of the problem. However, extra efforts will probably be required here by the sides. We do not want to dramatize the situation and we believe that the treaty on conventional armed forces will be ratified and will enter into force, and its implementation will lead to a sharp reduction of the level of military confrontation in Europe.

[Alekseyev] How long do you think it will take to reach the accords on disarmament questions, making it possible to set the date for the Gorbachev-Bush meeting?

[Churkin] A brief technical break has been announced at the strategic offensive armaments talks in Geneva. The delegations will meet again in mid-April. We hope that the time spent in the capitals will enable the Soviet and U.S. talks participants to gather their strength and complete the work on the treaty without delay. We believe that this can be done in a matter of weeks.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Warner Proposal To Review ABM Treaty Scored

PM2503110591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Mar 91 Union Edition p 6

[Report by A. Blinov: "'Desert Storm' Stardust"]

[Text] The U.S. Senator John Warner last week offered an unusual "bonus" to the package of benefits for servicemen who took part in the conflict with Iraq.

Speaking during a discussion of the bill on payments of additional money to servicemen and reservists, J. Warner suggested including in it the text of a resolution demanding a review of one of the most important agreements in the field of international security—the Soviet-U.S. treaty on ABM defense.

The treaty, signed in May 1972, bans the development, testing, and deployment of mobile sea-based, air-based, space-based, and land-based ABM systems. It is a termless document. In accordance with the strictly formulated procedure withdrawal from the treaty is possible only in the event of a direct threat to a country's "supreme national interests." Of course, nothing of the kind stems from the military victory of the anti-Iraqi coalition.

In his speech in the Senate and in his letters to colleagues about the initiative he has undertaken, Warner cited the successful use of the U.S. "Patriot" tactical ABM complex against the Iraqi "Scuds." Now it is the turn of space-based ABM facilities, the senator believes.

According to his proposal, the United States must within two years hold talks with the Soviet Union on the review of the restrictions set by the ABM Treaty. If they do not succeed in reaching agreement, then the United States should withdraw from the treaty unilaterally.

The senator not only suggested reviewing an international agreement which has already been in existence for nearly 19 years but also suggested violating it before the expiry of the deadline he himself set. He stated that the Pentagon, without waiting for the results of the talks, should prepare to develop and test the systems banned under the treaty.

J. Warner's references to support from the White House were a surprise to many senators. He reported that Vice President D. Quayle had expressed himself in favor of "restructuring" the treaty. B. Scowcroft, the president's national security aide, allegedly sent a letter saying that this resolution "will serve as an unambiguous signal of our readiness to embark on a strategic defense initiative which strengthens our national security."

Warner's proposal was opposed by many senators—not only Democrats, who are in the majority in the Senate, but also Republicans. Democratic Senator S. Nunn, the leading Senate specialist on military questions, who heads the Armed Services Committee, put forward a counterproposal switching some of the SDI program appropriations toward "Patriot" tactical missile complexes. Republican Senator W. Cohen denounced Warner's proposal as an attempt to "break the law."

It is not surprising that in this situation the signal to back off has been heard from the White House. Spokesmen for the Administration stated that Warner's idea is "untimely," although it accords with the Administration's course. Following this the senator retracted his proposal.

"The failure of the Republicans' initiative," Helen Dwyer, WASHINGTON POST Congressional correspondent, believes, "means at least a temporary setback for the Administration and its allies on the Capitol Hill who are trying to use the success of the war in the interests of achieving their political goals, including space-based ABM defense..." At the same time, in the correspondent's opinion, these attempts will obviously continue.

Senator J. Warner himself is not discouraged, however. He states that he intends to do everything to "persuade middle America" not to leave this question "to the will of a group of supporters of arms control."

Ladygin: ABM Treaty Review Would 'Totally Wreck' START

*LD0204230291 Moscow World Service
in English 1910 GMT 2 Apr 91*

[Commentary by military observer Colonel Vadim Solovyev]

[Text] In the United States, discussions have renewed about the Strategic Defense Initiative as a shield capable

of protecting the country against potential nuclear attacks, and demands can be heard, even in Congress, for a review of the superpower anti-ballistic missile treaty, the ABM. Our military observer, Colonel Vadim Solovyev, tries to explain why:

The main reason, says Vadim Solovyev, is that it was felt Patriot anti-missile missiles used to intercept by now obsolete Iraqi Scud missiles during the Gulf war are incapable of fighting modern long-range missiles. This is being clearly dismissed by SDI supporters. However, the deployment of Star Wars plan will be in breach of the 1972 ABM Treaty, whose implications go still far beyond the framework of superpower relations.

For this part General Fedor Ladygin of the Soviet Chief of Staff speaks of a linkage between the ABM Treaty and the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] yet to be signed: Should the ABM Treaty be reviewed or renounced, the move will totally wreck any basis for further START treaty talks. General Ladygin said the most dire implication was a runaway nuclear arms race, something that must be realized by Soviet partners at the negotiations as well.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

INF Verification Commission Amends Procedures

*LD0604115791 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1727 GMT 5 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vitaliy Makarchev]

[Text] Geneva, 5 April (TASS)—The 10th session of the Soviet-U.S. Special Verification Commission (SVC), set up in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. treaty on eliminating intermediate missiles ended in Geneva today.

During its work on 4 April, M.N. Streltsov and Steven E. Steiner, representatives of the USSR and the United States in the commission, signed two amendments to the memorandum on the accord applying to the verification provisions contained in the treaty on intermediate-range missiles. The memorandum on verification is the basic document envisaging the procedures and equipment for fulfilling the provisions of the treaty concerning on-site inspection.

The first amendment concerns the use by U.S. inspectors of a system to determine whether the missiles transported from the inspection site in Votkinsk are RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles restricted by the treaty.

The second permits U.S. and Soviet inspectors to have with them dosimeters for the purpose of personal medical monitoring during the inspections.

The two amendments to the memorandum on verification are the fifth and sixth documents connected with the

fulfilment of the treaty on intermediate-range missiles which have been prepared and signed in the SVC.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

USSR Said Too Open on Military Data

91WC0085A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
15 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Boris Tretyakov, representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by unidentified IAN correspondent: "More Open Than NATO..."; place and date not given]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense is convinced that people abroad know more than they need to about the military activity of our country.

The war in the Persian Gulf riveted the attention of the world community. But even against this tragic background, USSR military activity within its own borders has not been forgotten. Voices abroad have been resounding ever more frequently concerning the build-up of military activity in the Soviet Union. But where do matters stand in actuality?

This is the topic of discussion between our IAN correspondent and USSR Ministry of Defense representative Colonel Boris Tretyakov.

[Correspondent] First let us clarify what it is that stands behind these assertions.

[Tretyakov] If we are talking about more intensified combat training activity, let us look at the statistics. In 1987 we conducted 18 exercises on the scale which requires notification (those in which 13,000 or more troops participate). In 1988, we conducted 16, in 1989 nine, and this past year just four. We might also use the following figures for comparison. Whereas four years ago more than 40 operational-tactical exercises were conducted in the Soviet Armed Forces, in 1990 their number was reduced to less than one-fifth of this.

[Correspondent] But this is, as they say, on our own territory. What about outside our borders? Specifically, how does the Soviet Navy "conduct itself" on the world's oceans?

[Tretyakov] Whereas previously, for example, up to 15 submarines and 22 surface ships operated in the Mediterranean Sea depending on the situation, today there are no more than a total of six or seven Soviet warships there. In the Indian Ocean, the region closest to the Persian Gulf, the number of warships decreased from 14 to 17 down to three to five, accomplishing missions of protecting Soviet shipping...

[Correspondent] What, in your opinion, could possibly be behind the assertions of increased military activity in the USSR?

[Tretyakov] Accusations directed to the Soviet side of concealing certain data and exercises. But these are incompetent accusations.

Let us go back to the history of the practical development of confidence measures in Europe. This traces its origins to the Helsinki meeting of heads of CSCE member states in 1975. Agreement was reached at that time to provide information on a voluntary basis regarding the conduct of military exercises, and to invite observers to the most large-scale exercises. Prior to 1986, when the Stockholm Conference document was signed, the Western nations conducted 95 such exercises and the Warsaw Pact 30.

But the Stockholm agreements required mandatory notification of military activity when 13,000 or more individuals or 300 tanks take part, and also when 3,000 or more individuals take part in an amphibious landing or airborne drop. Foreign observers are invited when the level of participation reaches 17,000—or 5,000 in an airborne or maritime assault operation. Beginning in 1987 the Soviet Union provided notification on the conduct of 47 military exercises (NATO—46). Observers were invited to 15 of these (NATO—25). Therefore, all of our military activity—whether we like it or not—has come out into the limelight, as they say. Additionally, the Stockholm document afforded the right to each of the 35 CSCE participants to conduct inspections of military activity on the territory of any other CSCE participating state. Since 1987, inspection groups of the USSR Armed Forces have visited other countries on 15 occasions. Over this same period, 23 inspection teams have visited our forces. Thus, all the conditions have been established to ensure that nothing is hidden. It should be added that at the Paris meeting of heads of CSCE member states, the Vienna document was adopted which combined measures envisaged by the Stockholm agreements with new measures for solidifying confidence and security in Europe.

[Correspondent] Are such concepts as confidence and openness always understood in the same manner?

[Tretyakov] No, unfortunately. At Soviet troop exercises, foreign military observers are informed on a mandatory basis of their intent and the missions of units of all sizes. Then they see our forces in action and obtain answers to all their questions. The observers are always able, therefore, to draw fairly objective conclusions as to the nature of activity we are conducting—whether or not it is threatening.

But allow me to cite another type of example. In September of last year, the Norwegian Government invited observers to an assault landing during the NATO combined armed forces exercise "Teamwork-90." In spite of a request made by those invited, however, and an official protest registered by the representative of Switzerland, no one ever saw the landing conducted by a British-Dutch marine brigade.

This instance is entirely typical of NATO. As a rule, they carefully conceal the intent of the exercise from

observers and the true missions of exercise participants. Display of troop operations is limited to showing those of small technical and rear service support units.

In addition, a significant portion of the combat training exercises of NATO armies in recent years has been conducted on the scale from battalion to brigade. This means they can develop and perfect the training of their forces without informing CSCE participants. On the level of division and higher, as a rule, it is command-staff exercises and computer war games which are conducted, which also allow command and control of groupings of forces to be developed outside the notification requirement.

[Correspondent] So it turns out there is greater knowledge abroad about the military activity of our country than that of the NATO countries?

[Tretyakov] No doubt about it. Apparently, our national characteristics also play a role here—our open heart, our hospitality. We sometimes acquaint foreigners with the newest varieties of armament and technology although, according to international agreements presently in effect, we are not required to do so.

In the meantime, military activity on U.S. and Canadian territory to date does not fall under the purview of confidence and control measures. Nor do these encompass the activity of naval or air force activity—precisely the components with respect to which the United States and NATO in general have a significant superiority over the USSR. Thus, you can see that it is we who have greater cause for alarm.

Ladygin Asserts Military Backing for CFE Treaty

LD2703172391 Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 27 Mar 91

[Text] An opinion is expressed in the Western media that following the victory of the American troops in the Persian Gulf, the Soviet military are concerned about the level and quality of the arms at their disposal. It is claimed that this explains the inaction by the Soviet military on the treaty to reduce conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE], a treaty signed in Paris last November. Our guest speaker is Lieutenant General Fedor Ladygin:

This is an absolutely wrong opinion and an absolutely wrong notion of the stand of the Soviet General Staff on the issue, says the general. The foreign policies of the Soviet leadership have the full support of the General Staff. The chief of the General Staff himself repeatedly headed the disarmament group of the Soviet delegation at meetings of the Soviet and American foreign ministers. During the latest meeting in Moscow he sought a way out of the situation that had developed over the Paris treaty through no fault of ours, said Lieutenant General Fedor Ladygin.

Now it is claimed that the Soviet military concealed part of the armaments and took them from under the treaty's operation by giving them the status of naval arms. Lieutenant General Fedor Ladygin again:

General Ladygin says that the situation is totally different. The armaments of coastal defense and of the marine corps were taken away as a subject of talks on the insistence of the United States even before the talks began. The Soviet Union insisted that naval forces should also be a subject of the talks; however, it was the United States that categorically objected to that and still does. I must note in passing that coastal defense forces were set up in the Soviet Union in 1988 exactly at the time when the mandate for the talks was being (?drafted). It was precisely then that we insisted that all the naval forces including the coastal defense forces and the marine corps should be a subject for the talks. First of all the United States excluded the naval armaments, and now the situation around the treaty is being dramatized. I think the point is not whether to include or not to include these armaments in the Paris treaty; the thing is, apparently, that some forces are not interested in deepening and expanding the disarmament process, and that's the main thing, said General Ladygin.

We offered a pragmatic solution. We won't build up armaments in our coastal defense forces, more than that we are willing to reduce the number of armaments of ground troops—that's tanks, personnel carriers and artillery—by the amount that we have in the coastal defense forces. I think that those who are interested in the treaty must appreciate this radical proposal, the general said.

General Staff Aide Details Armed Forces Cuts

PM2903160991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General F.I. Ladygin, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Treaty and Legal Directorate, by TASS correspondent; place and date not given: "From Plans to Practical Actions"]

[Text] The U.S. military leadership plans to cut its national armed forces. A TASS correspondent asked Lt. Gen. F.I. Ladygin, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Treaty and Legal Directorate, to comment on this Pentagon decision and compare it with the Soviet Army cuts:

[Ladygin] Citing U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney, NEWSWEEK reported that the plan is to cut the number of U.S. Navy warships from 545 to 435 and the Marine Corps from 196,000 to 160,000 men by 1997. Provision is made for cutting the number of ground divisions by 10 by 1995. Soviet military circles regard these as positive intentions on the part of the U.S. side.

Back in 1978 at the UN General Assembly first special session on disarmament the Soviet Union said that there was a possibility of implementing cuts in armed forces and conventional arms. The unilateral withdrawal from

the GDR of 20,000 Soviet servicemen, 1,000 tanks, and other military hardware was an example of the USSR's serious approach in this sphere.

In line with the decisions adopted in 1988 on unilateral cuts in the USSR Armed Forces, the numerical strength of the Army and Navy is to drop by 500,000. Some 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 820 combat aircraft are to be cut in the European part of the country and the groups of forces.

In the process of tailoring the USSR Armed Forces to suit the demands of contemporary military doctrine and imparting a greater defensive thrust to their organizational structure there are to be cuts in the quantity of arms and hardware of 10,500 tanks, 19,900 artillery systems, and 1,000 combat aircraft.

To date, since the unilateral Armed Forces cuts began, we have disbanded the directorates of two military districts, four combined-arms armies, five army corps, one missile formation, five missile units, and four air defense divisions. Some 38 tank and motorized rifle divisions, 27 missile regiments, two military district aviation formations, two aviation divisions, six anti-aircraft missile brigades, and a number of other formations and units have been cut back.

As a result, as compared with 1988, the numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces has dropped by more than 450,000 servicemen. In the European part of the USSR and groups of forces the number of tanks, combat armored vehicles, artillery systems, and combat aircraft have been reduced by 20,500, 19,300, 28,400, and 1,950 respectively; while 26 submarines and 45 surface ships and launches have been decommissioned and scrapped.

As is well known, the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty is to be abolished by 31 March 1991. The Soviet Union will complete the withdrawal of its troops from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary by 1 July 1991. The troop withdrawal from FRG territory is continuing. We are beginning to withdraw troops from Poland.

Thus, further cuts in the Soviet Armed Forces, their numerical strength, and basic arms systems are envisaged within the framework of the military reform now under way, but, of course, without detriment to the country's defense capability and with consideration for the development of the world military-political and military-strategic situation.

Grinevskiy Assesses Beginning of CFE II Talks

OW2903091491 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1900 GMT 28 Mar 91

[From the "Utro 120 + 30" program; interview with Oleg Grinevskiy, Soviet chief delegate to the CFE talks]

[Text] The second round of the new stage of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] has ended in Vienna. Here is our report:

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] What was done at this Vienna-2 round?

[Grinevskiy] First, we agreed on the format for exchanging information on military forces and the basic categories of arms and equipment in Europe. Second, preparations for a seminar on military doctrines in which the chiefs of general staffs of the European countries, the United States, and Canada will participate, have moved to a practical level. Finally, I would say that we managed to start the work of the Center for Averting Conflicts. In itself this may be a technical fact, but it is extremely important. The center, an all-European center, has begun its work. This is the positive side.

As far as the negative side is concerned, I must say directly that we did not manage to begin formulating an agreement on decreasing the number of forces in Europe. Of course this was a major shortcoming in our work. But I hope that in three weeks time when we resume our work here, we will manage to begin the formulation of this agreement too. [end recording]

U.S. Questions Soviet Compliance on Disarmament

LD2803164291 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 28 Mar 91

[Text] It's a long time since East-West relations experienced a crisis of trust. However, a sober look at their current condition shows that in the field of disarmament the situation is close to the one that kept the sides apart in the past. Mikhail Mayorov now comments:

This time, the treaty to cut conventional forces in Europe has evoked a serious controversy. Signed at a European conference in Paris last November, the treaty is faced with the risk of not being ratified unless doubts over the Soviet Union's compliance with the treaty are cleared up.

The United States secretary of state and his German and British colleagues who visited Moscow recently spoke with concern about thousands of Soviet tanks moved from Europe to areas east of the Ural Mountains and about three Soviet armored divisions being made subordinate to the Naval command. The West claims that all that made it possible to put these forces beyond the bounds of the Paris treaty.

The Soviet military argues that the redeployment of tanks and the change in the status of the armored divisions had taken place before the European heads of state and the leaders of the United States and of Canada put their signatures to the treaty. Besides, the USSR Defense Ministry says that NATO's leaders were informed about these steps in advance.

Yet, the reaction from Western capitals, in particular from Washington, was very sharp. The United States linked a future cut in strategic offensive arms with an improvement in the situation involving the conventional forces treaty. Disarmament has begun to slow down.

Wholesale support for either side is the last thing an impartial analyst should do. It's a hard fact that a certain amount of military equipment and manpower has been taken beyond the bounds of the conventional forces treaty, and our partners in the West, too, have reasons for alarm.

Reports published in Moscow following negotiations with James Baker, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and Douglas Hurd produce the impression that President Gorbachev is concerned about that to a no smaller degree. After all, he deservedly takes the credit for the decisive contribution to current disarmament processes. He has been doing business in a sincere, open, (?uninterested) way, and it is very unlikely that his sole aim was to lure everybody in a trap. Apparently, this affair has come as a surprise to the president himself.

Yet, the situation is not hopeless as long as a credibility crisis is avoided. During James Baker's visit to Moscow, the Soviet Union put forward a number of proposals concerning the implementation of the conventional forces treaty. A message from President Bush delivered to President Gorbachev on Monday confirms the intention of the two countries to continue contacts in order to achieve clarity and progress at disarmament talks. Probably a further dialogue will prove helpful in finding a settlement. If the sides agree to spreading disarmament to the naval forces, many, if not all, of today's disputes will be lifted. The most important thing now is to keep the negotiations going.

Karpov on Disputes Over Data Exchange, Naval Units

LD3003190791 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1215 GMT 29 Mar 91

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Pavlovich Karpov by correspondent Vladimir Pasko; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Pasko] Hello, comrades. Now that peace has returned triumphantly to the Persian Gulf region, attention is again returning to topical matters. It has been four months since the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries signed a treaty in Paris on conventional armed forces in Europe. After decades of confrontation, the two largest military and political organizations at long last stated that they would strive to replace military confrontation with relations of a new nature: security on the basis of peaceful cooperation. By way of confirming this, the sides pledged to retain only such military potential as is essential to prevent war and to ensure effective defense.

As the first step toward this goal, the two sides agreed on substantial cuts, down to definite levels, of five categories of offensive arms. But it now transpires that obstacles have emerged on the path to the treaty coming into force. The parliaments of Western countries refuse to ratify it. If the press is anything to go by, the reason for this consists of three aspects: confusion with numerical data, our transfer of several thousands tanks from Europe to the other side of the Urals in 1989, and the transfer of three Soviet ground forces divisions to the Navy's administration. The first two concerns appear to have been removed, but things turned out to be more complicated as far as the third aspect is concerned. This, then, is the reason behind our meeting with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov.

Viktor Pavlovich, what has happened, and what is the way out of the situation that has taken shape?

[Karpov] The questions now surfacing have their source in the old dispute regarding the scope of the talks. Right from the very beginning the Soviet Union came out in favor of including Navy, ground forces, and Air Force arms alike in the total balance of arms under discussion at the Vienna talks and their subsequent inclusion among the arms to be cut per the treaty. Unfortunately, the NATO countries rejected this position. As a result, the scope of the talks, approved in January 1989, included the proviso that Naval arms are not included in the subject matter of the current talks. But, even before that, the Soviet Union, implementing its new doctrine, military doctrine, began to restructure its military forces along defensive principles. And in connection with this, three motor rifle divisions were transferred to coast guard duties—that is to say, to the Navy establishment.

On 18 November last year, on the eve of the signing of the treaty, the USSR presented data about its Armed Forces, about the Coast Guard, the Marines, separately from those armaments which, according to the treaty, were subject to being registered. It must be said that at that time we were not asked about this. But now, the NATO countries are raising the question of these armaments and are complaining that we, allegedly, want to keep armaments of the Coast Guard and the Marines above the levels which we are supposed to have, in accordance with the treaty. This refers, primarily, to those categories of armaments as tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery pieces. Therefore, it is a question of the interpretation of Article 3 of the treaty, which is concerned with the composition of the armaments subject to limitation.

We think that the sides discussed this question for quite long enough, at this theoretical level, as it were, but did not arrive at a common opinion. The mandate of the talks was a compromise. Therefore, now, we think that to continue such an argument with regard to the interpretation of the treaty is hardly likely to create the opportunity to find a mutually acceptable decision. Therefore, during our contacts, including the recent ones with Secretary of State Baker, with German Vice Chancellor

Genscher, with British Foreign Secretary Hurd, these questions were discussed. The Soviet Union proposes to seek the resolution of questions which arise along practical paths.

We are prepared to accept that the levels which are allocated to the Soviet Union under the treaty—that is, 13,150 tanks, 13,175 artillery pieces and 20,000 (armored vehicles), that these levels should not be exceeded on account of these three divisions of the coastal defense. We are ready to discuss such a solution. We are prepared to seek a mutually acceptable formula here. Now, it is up to our Western partners, so I think that such a practical approach, of calm diplomacy, of a calm search for mutually acceptable solutions, will probably be likely to produce results.

[Pasko] Viktor Pavlovich, a hidden question that arises is whether or not opponents of the treaty are making their existence felt in this connection.

[Karpov] I would not begin witch hunting in this regard. The treaty in itself is of very great significance for the further construction of the common European home and the creation of new European security structures. For this reason, attitudes toward it throughout all of Europe are uniformly positive. There are, of course, people who are opposed in principle to new approaches toward the creation of a European security system. There are people who think that reliance on military force guarantees security. However, I think that there are fewer and fewer people ready to uphold that position. There is, therefore, a search for new structures of security, security that encompasses all of Europe, the entire European continent, and envisages a transition from confrontation based on military blocs to cooperation between all European states, including the reduction in the numbers of the Armed Forces in the European continent and the reduction of their offensive potential, and a transition to a defensive footing, and so on. This is starting through the Paris Treaty and by the confidence-building measures agreed to and approved in Paris.

This course is receiving more and more support. If tendencies running counter to this are appearing in various European countries, they will certainly have no chance of developing. Therefore, I would assess the difficulties that have arisen in the implementation of the treaty as echoes of the differences over what should first and foremost be limited by the treaty, which were also revealed while agreement was being reached on the mandate for the talks—in other words, over whether or not the armaments of the navies should be limited now, at this stage of the talks. We continue to think that the limitation of such forces should become part of a Europe-wide decision on security matters, and we shall actively strive to achieve this.

[Pasko] Now, for a question that is not directly connected, but is indirectly, I think, connected with the first one. Implementation of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range

Missiles in Europe is to be completed in May. This treaty was a breakthrough in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. All of us can recall with what hopes it was welcomed. One can say that the hopes have been vindicated. The treaty has been followed by the preparation of an agreement on reducing strategic offensive armaments [START]. The text of the treaty is almost ready, and yet something still remains to be done. What is the reason?

[Karpov] Indeed, from the sidelines it may seem somewhat strange that both powers, both the United States and the Soviet Union, say that the treaty on strategic offensive arms limitation is virtually ready, that a few technical issues need to be resolved, and it can be signed. But, at the same time, the treaty is not ready for signing. At the moment, on the initiative of the American side, a break in the talks in Geneva has been announced. What is going on? We can trace a certain tendency, right now, on the American side to tie the resolution on strategic arms with implementation of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. This is informal; that is, officially there is no such stand, but in fact it can clearly be discerned. We might think that the issues which remain, 12 to 15 issues, are resolvable, that they are of a technical nature, and that the political issues have been resolved. But recently we have come across a position of the U.S. delegation in Geneva which, I would say, could be describe in one word as stalling. Either they do not have their instructions from Washington, or some issue is sent off to Washington for further consideration, or some extra issue arises on the American side that was not raised earlier in this connection, and so on. Finally, it has now become clear that Ambassador Burt, head of the U.S. delegation, is resigning. This is another factor that had to be taken into account, and so on. That is, there you have the situation. In my view, of course, it does not help to conclude the talks quickly, and we agreed with the U.S. side to arrange a break, to look things over, and to embark on completing the elaboration of the treaty again in April. I think that, of course, the elimination of the disagreements existing over the treaty on conventional arms in Europe will, of course, make it possible to speed up these talks on strategic arms, as well.

[Pasko] Viktor Pavlovich, I'd like to ask another question. There is an active search going on in Europe for new security structures. The countries of eastern Europe are looking for their paths, new approaches to the problems of security are being worked out in the West, but at the time when, on 31 March, the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty ceases to exist, the military organization of NATO is not only not being dissolved, but is being modernized.

The presence of our strategic forces guarantees us protection from anything unexpected, but still, how are we to regard this, to regard the fact that the NATO military organization is being maintained, at least up to today?

[Karpov] These questions certainly exist. They are serious questions. We certainly must not brush them aside. It must be said that new tendencies are now

becoming visible in the actual NATO organization, and in its military part, tendencies which can also be described as a movement in the direction of reconsidering the most offensive ideas of NATO, ideas connected with the use of nuclear weapons, the conduct of offensive operations. That is to say, a certain reexamination of the actual basic postulates of NATO military doctrine is going on.

Already, the NATO evaluation of what used to be called the Soviet threat has changed. I would say that there is a reevaluation of values, so that not many people now believe that the Soviet Union represents an aggressive state that only sleeps and dreams of how to seize western Europe by means of armed force. No one takes this seriously any more. For that reason, the very structure of NATO, the very aim of the NATO military doctrine, is starting to come under pressure from both political figures and from the public toward reconsidering it.

The seminar taking place on the military doctrine in the framework of the Vienna talks showed that these tendencies are gaining more and more weight. The political cooperation being laid down between us and NATO now that we have appointed our ambassador to Brussels—this contact is now gaining significant weight. We are being given information. We, in turn, inform NATO about our actions. I must say the demands to go more energetically down the road of creating common European security structures are knocking more and more at today's door.

The reduction of armed forces in Europe as a result of the Paris Treaty is the first brick in the foundation of a future common European system. This is the very great significance of the treaty. Now, of course, we need to more actively promote the idea of creating new European structures.

When it is said that certain East European countries are knocking at NATO's door, wanting to enter and increase NATO's military potential, I would not overdramatize these reports. The fact is that, as far as can be judged from the information in our possession, NATO countries are not interested in East European countries becoming part of NATO's military structure. I think that this will not occur within the next few years.

Therefore, the question is how the Soviet Union may, in the new conditions, guarantee its security in view of the withdrawal of our forces from East European countries and in view of the departure of these countries from the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty. In this regard, reserves and possibilities do exist for the conclusion of a system. I would say, of bilateral relations with East European countries that would, well, they would not replace the military form of cooperation, and now probably there should be no question of that, but they would attest to possibilities for ensuring our security in this area with the assistance of these countries that accord with the general interests of both the East European countries, and also the security interests of the Soviet

Union. In this respect, our work is far from over and we are still only just getting down to it.

I would say that the fact that NATO will remain a military force in Europe is a reality. But further progress toward the creation of Europe-wide institutions, the economic integration of Europe, its legal integration, the creation of what is called a common law-governed space, and other measures to create the common European home is indeed the path that should bring about a strengthening of security on a new basis.

[Pasko] Many thanks.

U.S. Seen as Uncompromising on Naval Divisions

LD3003051491 Moscow World Service in English
2300 GMT 29 Mar 91

[News analyst Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] Washington regards the differences in the interpretation of the already signed treaty—awaiting ratification—on conventional armaments in Europe as a stumbling block. Everything in it centers around actually one point. These are the three Soviet divisions situated on the shores of the Baltic and Black Seas. The Soviet side believes that these forces belong to the coastal defense and belong to the Navy, and for this reason they are not to be reduced under the treaty covering the ground troops. The American side does not agree to that.

It would seem that in such a case the already tested method should be used—looking for and finding a compromise. However, this method, which worked well earlier at Soviet-American talks, no longer suits the U.S. Administration for some reason. During a recent visit to Moscow, American Secretary of State James Baker was offered a compromise. But the United States refused to go its part of the way. Washington keeps sticking to an irreconcilable stand. Unless Moscow meets the U.S. demand, the administration won't put the treaty to Congress for ratification.

Initiatives put forward in the Senate also fail to find support. For example, Senator Joseph Biden has proposed that the treaty on conventional armaments in Europe can be ratified if a specific reservation is made which will (?fix) down the U.S. stand on the disputed issue. This move proposed by Senator Biden, indicating a search for a way out, was rejected by the State Department as wrong. Why be so categorical about a problem that has caused the differences in the stands of Moscow and Washington? The fact the problem remains unsolved has become an obstacle for advance in other areas of Soviet-American relations, and finishing work on reducing strategic offensive armaments, and in setting the time for a visit to Moscow by President Bush, scheduled for the first half of this year.

As Senator Biden said, reasonable speaking at a Senate foreign relations subcommittee hearing, the CFE treaty

is the key to unlocking not only valuable cuts in conventional arms but also progress on other fronts.

Some news analysts and political observers in the United States are currently writing much about the influence of the military in the Soviet Union on the talks to reduce arms. But whatever the influence, it does not prevent the Soviet Union from putting forward concrete compromises, including one on the problem that has arisen in the interpretation of the treaty to reduce conventional armaments in Europe.

U.S. Presses for CFE Treaty Concessions

PM0304101791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Mar 91 Second Edition p 6

["View From Moscow" by Yevgeniy Shashkov: "Are We Threatened With 'Pre-Malta Period'"]

[Text] "The Moscow summit, postponed from early February and planned for late in the first half of the year, has now been blocked by a dispute over the treaty on reducing conventional forces in Europe signed last November in Paris. The U.S. side is refusing to submit the treaty for ratification until Moscow reviews its decision to remove three infantry divisions from the treaty's ambit by transferring them to the Navy. Unless this problem is settled, there will be no progress at the talks that are supposed to complete the preparation of a treaty on strategic arms (it is proposed to sign this at the summit)."

The above comment comes from the U.S. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. It is by no means the "harshest" of the numerous statements now being made in the West about the disarmament process. It is reasonable to ask: What is the matter, what has happened? After all, just three or four months ago fanfares about the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] signed in Paris in November were thundering out from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The West attributes the "misunderstandings" that have arisen between Moscow and Washington about the Paris agreement primarily to the position of the military, in particular the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and the Soviet military-industrial complex as a whole. U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker himself expressed this view in a television speech after his mid-March visit to Moscow. The West's main charges are essentially that the USSR is concealing from its treaty partners a huge quantity of arms falling within the treaty's ambit—in particular, over 20,000 tanks, many thousands of armored fighting vehicles, artillery systems, and so forth—and is also building up the strength of its marines. In my view, there is much that is cunning in these allegations. The leaders of the USSR Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces General Staff have repeatedly provided extremely well reasoned explanations about these charges.

I will remind you of some of them. Indeed, as of mid-1988 there were 41,500 tanks in Europe. On the eve

of the signing of the Paris agreements the USSR began to use the figure of 21,000 (7,500 of these are subject to reduction under the treaty on conventional arms). Where are the other 20,000, the West is asking today. The USSR Armed Forces General Staff responds with a question: Have people in the West so swiftly forgotten something that they themselves applauded? The reference is to the USSR's unilateral initiative to reduce its Armed Forces, announced almost 2.5 years ago. As a result, even before the signing of the Paris agreements, in the course of the transfer of the USSR Armed Forces to a defensive structure and the withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries 8,000 tanks were dispatched from the combat strength in the European part of the USSR to beyond the Urals for refitting [pereoborudovaniye] and to bring forces up to strength [doobespecheniye voysk]. 8,400 were stationed at storage facilities in West Siberia and Central Asia, and about 4,000 tanks were scrapped. If we total up these figures, we get the required 20,000 tanks.

I can foresee objections: Be that as it may, this still introduces elements of distrust into the spirit of cooperation between the West and the USSR. I agree, but only if NATO headquarters did not know about this. But it was informed even before the signing of the Paris treaty. E. Shevardnadze informed J. Baker of this in September and then in October 1990. In short, the USSR Defense Ministry believes, the United States and its allies knew that the transfer of tanks (and other types of arms) to beyond the Urals was carried out outside the framework of the treaty, and the Soviet Union was not bound by any treaty commitments.

As for the West's main charge, the transfer of three Ground Forces divisions to the marines allegedly in violation of the treaty, explanations have also been given regarding these complaints too. There was no buildup of the marines to evade the treaty. The USSR took measures to more reliably cover coastal sectors in view of the considerable superiority enjoyed by the United States and NATO in shock and mobile naval systems. According to the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, these measures began to be implemented back in 1987. As a result three divisions of Ground Forces were transferred to the Navy as coastal defense (not marine) divisions.

You can accept or reject these explanations from the Soviet military. But, in my view, U.S. experts, especially after the allies essentially won the war with Iraq from the sea, should feel simply "ashamed" of fanning subjects connected with naval forces in the context of the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Arms. But since this is being done, I would remind them that it was precisely the NATO countries that prevented the inclusion of naval forces within the purview of the Vienna talks. In the opinion of analysts from the "Russian-American University" center for international and military-political research, the real reason for this was that NATO enjoys substantial superiority over the Warsaw Pact in this regard.

As is well known, the subject of the talks was only arms stationed on land. The NATO countries did not respond to sensible points regarding the need to take into account, if only indirectly, NATO's advantages in naval forces and reduced the correlation of military forces in Europe solely to the correlation between armed forces and armaments based on land. But a considerable proportion of naval arms is also stationed on land—land-based naval aviation, for instance. Thus, on the one hand, naval forces were removed from the scope of the restrictions, and, on the other, the part of this branch of the armed forces stationed on land remained a subject of the talks.

This contradiction was in NATO's favor: Its naval aviation is largely based on ships. Soviet naval aviation is largely based on land. If you compare their purposes, land-based naval aviation is predominantly a defensive weapon, it is directed against any threat from the sea. Whereas carrier-based aviation is mostly intended for operations against ground targets on the other side's territory. The war in the Persian Gulf is vivid confirmation of this. I am recalling all this not to "reproach" anyone, but merely because the agreed levels of reductions in conventional arms and equipment could have been even more radical if the entire balance of forces, that is, taking naval forces into account, had been examined.

Let us be frank: The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe by no means exhausts all the problems of disarmament on the continent. It is not the fault of the military that it has already partly lost its basis even before ratification. After all, when it was being prepared and signed, the blocs were used as a basis: Over there is the North Atlantic bloc, here we have the Warsaw Pact. They have so many weapons, we have so many, and so forth. Today, when the Warsaw Pact has ceased to exist as a military organization and our former allies are beginning to cast "sidelong glances" in the direction of NATO, people who are serious about the military aspects of the USSR's security are expressing alarm. The Pentagon is also fanning such sentiments, although not deliberately, in my view. I am referring to the defense minister's annual report on U.S. military policy at the present stage and prospects for its development submitted to G. Bush in mid-March. It shows a tendency to clearly exaggerate the role of the military might of the United States and its allies as the main nucleus of European stability and its main guarantor. The old theses about forward basing and global deterrence are again being heard. The Western strategists' theorizing about the permissibility and desirability of expanding NATO's "geography," right up to the USSR's western border, is also worrying.

But we have already been through all this. Is this not enough? Or do some people believe that the Soviet Union should be "squeezed some more," and then it will at long last be brought to its knees. Indeed, at present things are going far from brilliantly in domestic life in our country. But for all that, as the aforementioned

report by R. Cheney asserts, "be that as it may, in the security sphere the Soviet Union will continue to be the only country in the world capable of destroying the United States."

I am citing that quotation not to console or encourage anyone, but as an objective reality. Also because today Washington is trying to link even the agreement on strategic offensive arms with the reduction of conventional arms. That is, once again there are conditions, once again there is linkage. Nothing good will come of this. If this continues, we will not notice that we are sliding back into the "pre-Malta period." I am referring to the memorable Malta meeting, where an unparalleled atmosphere of sincerity and trust was established between the USSR and the United States.

General Views East Europe Troop Withdrawals

LD0104132491 Moscow TASS in English 1256 GMT
1 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, April 1 (TASS)—"The Soviet Union faithfully abides by its commitments to withdraw troops from East European countries," Major-General Vladimir Zhurbenko, deputy head of a main department of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, told TASS today in connection with the end of a regular phase of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East European countries. "Not a single Soviet tank has remained in Czechoslovakia by now," he pointed out.

More than 90,000 servicemen, 1,041 tanks, 2,902 combat armoured vehicles, more than 1,080 artillery systems and about 130 aircraft are to be withdrawn from the Western Group of Troops (Germany) in 1991, General Zhurbenko said.

"By April 1, almost 30 percent of personnel subject to withdrawal, more than 60 percent of tanks, 29 percent of combat armoured vehicles and 27 percent of artillery systems have already been pulled out since the beginning of this year," Zhurbenko emphasized.

In 1991, about 20,000 servicemen, 284 combat armoured vehicles, 165 artillery systems and 41 aircraft were planned to be withdrawn before June 30, 1991—the deadline for full withdrawal of troops—from the Central Group of Troops (Czechoslovakia).

"By April 1, more than a half of servicemen out of the number, 70 percent of combat armoured vehicles, 80 percent of artillery systems and 80 percent of aircraft have already been withdrawn.

"More than 15,000 servicemen, 214 tanks, 126 combat armoured vehicles, 115 artillery systems, and 116 aircraft are to be withdrawn from the beginning of the year to June 30 from the Southern Group of Troops (Hungary).

"By April 1, 36 percent of the personnel, 75 percent of tanks, 67 percent of combat armoured vehicles and 55 percent of artillery systems have already been withdrawn," the general said.

Zhurbenko voiced conviction that "the withdrawal of Soviet troops will be completed within the specified time-frame".

Ladygin Rejects Charges on Data Exchange, Naval Divisions

LD0404090191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0748 GMT 4 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 4 April (TASS)—"Attempts by some Western politicians to accuse the USSR of violating the provisions of the treaty on the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe are absolutely groundless," Lieutenant General Fedor Ladygin, head of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff directorate, has said. He gave an interview to our TASS correspondent today, explaining the Soviet position on this question.

Speaking about the charges made against the USSR, that it allegedly "failed to provide complete figures for its arms and armed forces in the treaty's zone of application, i.e., from the Atlantic to the Urals," Fedor Ladygin pointed out that the Soviet Union named all the arms it possessed on 19 November 1990—the date the treaty was signed. "Three months later, as was envisaged, we cited already amplified information in Vienna," the head of the administration stressed. He added that these figures could be verified with the aid of inspections.

Broaching the question of Marine and Coast Guard arms that allegedly "through the USSR's fault are not counted in the overall levels," Gen. Ladygin stressed that this did not occur through the Soviet Union's fault. "From the very beginning when the mandate was being drafted, we were insistent that not only the land troops but the naval forces too should be subject to limitations and reductions," he noted.

In the general's opinion, "the United States and some Western allies then categorically objected to this." He said that eventually the USSR agreed not to include the naval forces arms in the overall level of arms being reduced. Therefore, Fedor Ladygin believes, to say now that these arms should be included in the arms being limited "is totally incorrect and juridically unfounded." According to him, the Marines and Coast Guard forces are a component part of the Soviet naval forces. This was established before the talks began and they were always designated exclusively for the defense of the country's sea coasts.

"Since the treaty was signed, no units or subunits have been transferred from one service of our armed forces to another. I state this absolutely responsibly," Lt. Gen. Fedor Ladygin said in conclusion.

Bush Comment on Settling Differences 'Inspires Hope'

LD0404182491 Moscow TASS in English 1753 GMT 4 Apr 91

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, April 4 (TASS)—The German newspaper BILD reported that President George Bush during a press stakeout with him on a golf course in Florida briefly touched on Soviet-American talks on arms control and said that the Soviet Union and the United States "have some difficulties" on Conventional Arms in Europe (CFE) to work out. "We've maintained that we should get a start agreement," President Bush said and added that "we've got to work out details on these arms control agreements now".

Indeed, problems did arise recently in the discussion of the conventional forces agreement not only because of different interpretations of the already agreed provisions.

Some days ago, the Warsaw Pact military structure was annulled. Henceforth, the Soviet Union will have to solve all problems of its security relying on its own forces.

But all specific cuts in troops and armaments under the CFE agreement were based on the balance of forces between the two military alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

Incidentally, under the CFE agreement, the Soviet Union was to eliminate or withdraw from Europe almost 20 times as many arms as the United States.

The Warsaw Pact no longer exists, but NATO continues to function. Moreover, the Soviet Union has begun to pull out its troops from Eastern Europe. These changes can by no means be ignored.

It is hardly advisable to review the principal provisions of the conventional forces agreement. However, the changes in the balance of strengths call for certain correctives in the implementation of the agreement. The decision on these correctives must be made at the negotiation table on a mutually acceptable basis.

One of the stumbling blocks in the implementation of the conventional forces agreement is the fate of three Soviet marine divisions. It is important to note that they were created on the basis of motorized infantry divisions before the agreement was signed. The problem of these divisions was discussed earlier but was not solved for a number of reasons. After the conventional forces agreement was signed, no Soviet units were transferred from one kind of armed forces to another.

When work first began on the mandate for talks, the Soviet Union insisted from the very beginning that not only land forces but also naval forces should be limited and cut. However, the United States and its NATO allies

objected against this proposal, obviously seeking to retain the West's massive supremacy in the number of marine troops. The Gulf war made clear once again the need to take naval forces into account during the arms control talks.

President Bush's statement concerning the readiness to settle differences the two sides have in their talks and work out details on these arms control agreements obviously testifies to the fact that the White House has not lost interest in reaching an arms control agreement on a mutually acceptable basis. This inspires hope.

Moiseyev on Asymmetrical Cuts, Naval Divisions

PM0704174591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Apr 91 Union Edition p 6

[Article by Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister: "Problems of Security: A Considered Approach Is Needed"—for the full text of Moiseyev's article, see the FBIS Daily Report: SOVIET UNION for 8 April 1991, pages 1-4]

[Excerpts] Thoughts of the country's security have been suggested by recent events. The war in the Persian Gulf region is over. The Warsaw Pact's military structure has ceased to exist, as has, in fact, this entire organization. We remain alone against NATO, without allies. The treaties and agreements concluded last year on a German settlement have come into effect. All our troops will have returned home to their own territory before the end of 1994, and there will no longer be a so-called defensive "buffer zone."

A new situation has arisen. In the assessment of U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney, "the West has scored a tremendous strategic success" in strengthening its influence over the countries of Europe. Are all these special features taken into consideration in our security? Are we acting correctly in adhering to the former line with regard to the creation of a nonbloc system of European security? Will the country's security and defense not be weakened? These are natural questions. I will express some views on this. [passage omitted]

Collective European security structures of at least 34 states could be a worthy alternative to bloc confrontation. The substance of such structures is multifaceted. They are set forth in concentrated form in the "Charter for a New Europe." It is now necessary to act and to advance toward the planned goals by preserving equilibrium and stability and not infringing the Soviet Union's interests. If the members of the alliance, following the guidelines of the 1990 London Declaration, were to begin transforming it into an exclusively political alliance, it would be possible to speak even now of a fundamental change in NATO's functions.

This is not happening. Despite changes in the European climate, the NATO members are not venturing to break up the bloc's military structures. They are trying to

preserve the basic principles of their strategy: to strengthen the alliance, to rely on force and nuclear deterrence, to maintain the armed forces' ability to have a quick and effective impact on conflicts and crises which arise in the world, to participate in the disarmament process on terms advantageous to themselves.

In building the armed forces, priority is given to achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union, primarily by utilizing the latest technology. Strategic offensive and defensive forces and air- and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons are being developed, and an adequate number of U.S. forward-based forces is being preserved. The bloc's conventional forces will evidently be switched to multinational formations and will possess great strike power and be highly mobile. An increase in the combat potential of the air force, the navy, and the rapid deployment and strategic redeployment forces is expected. All this is characteristic, in the main, of an offensive, not defensive, strategy.

This is the situation. We are far from dramatizing it and rushing to extremes. But the situation objectively obliges us to weigh our state interests anew in connection with the preservation of NATO's military organization as a force opposed to the Soviet Union. Now we must obviously rely not on illusory nonbloc security but on the organization of the country's defense independently, within national borders. We are capable of resolving this task. Certain guarantees are provided by the Paris documents and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. It is important now to define how best to ensure our security interests in relations both with NATO and with the countries of East Europe. How are we to prevent NATO troops from ending up on the USSR's western borders? It seems that our actions must be based not on military opposition and confrontation but on cooperation and trust, a treaty-legal settlement, and the peaceful development of the all-European process. [passage omitted]

II.

Our approaches in the disarmament sphere are being sharply criticized in the new situation—they supposedly do not take account of the elimination of the Warsaw Pact's military structures, Germany's unification within NATO, or the Soviet troop withdrawal from central European countries. In fact, this is not so. All questions are resolved in an interrelated way, from the position of ensuring the country's reliable security. Our policy in the disarmament sphere is aimed at lessening military confrontation and reducing armed forces and arms on a mutual basis. We favor getting away from the arms race, conducting the disarmament process in all areas, and making it continuous. I am sure that, on the whole, this policy accords with the Soviet people's interests and leads to stronger stability and universal security.

But it is not easy to defend and implement this policy. Many factors—economic, sociopolitical, psychological, purely military—have to be considered. It is necessary to

take into account pacifist sentiments, whose holders try to suggest to people that because the "cold war" is over, the era of universal peace and prosperity has supposedly already arrived, that no one will attack us or has any intention of doing so, that the Army is not needed and must be reduced, including unilaterally, and that state sovereignty can supposedly be defended by political means.

I believe that such an ideal has not yet arrived. Yes, military tension has diminished. The threat of war has receded. But it has not been consigned to the archives. The large-scale conflict in the Persian Gulf shows that the ending of the "cold war" does not remove entirely the danger of war. It persists, just as the gamble on force and pressure persists. The international situation remains complex. There are crises, rivalry, clashes of interests and forces, and all kinds of global and regional contradictions which might be fraught with wars and conflicts.

Overt U.S. claims to the role of world leader are being renewed. "Today, in a rapidly changing world, America's leadership is necessary," President Bush declares. The Pentagon's leader speaks of the same thing: "Peace and stability throughout the world will depend, as before, on the might and determination of the United States and on our readiness to ensure an active presence throughout the world where our interests and our allies' interests are threatened." The obsession with leading world development pushes the United States toward attempts to secure military superiority and to demonstrate its superpower status in relations with the Soviet Union.

All this must be taken into account. Questions of the country's security must be resolved without emotion and realistically, and they must be constantly "verified" through the prism of Soviet-U.S. relations and USSR-NATO relations. We must defend our legitimate state interests responsibly. We must lower the levels of military confrontation on equal terms, without undermining defense capability. Precisely this approach is enshrined in the Soviet position at the talks on disarmament topics.

For example, let us take the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Its chief substance is the decisive curtailment of the arms race and huge reductions in the most destabilizing weapons systems. Forty months after the treaty's ratification and thereafter the collective arms levels of each of the groups of states (the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO) must not exceed 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery systems (100-mm caliber and above), 30,000 combat armored vehicles, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters.

Of the total quantity of arms and hardware which all states within the area of the treaty's application will be left with after the reductions, the maximum arms ceilings for the USSR (in accordance with the agreement signed by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest on 3 November 1990) in the European part will be as follows:

13,150 tanks, 13,175 artillery pieces, 20,000 armored vehicles, 5,150 combat aircraft, and 1,500 attack helicopters. That is, the highest national arms levels are being set for us, compared with other countries, which compensates to some extent for our country's changed strategic position following the elimination of the Warsaw Pact's military structures.

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe is now being discussed and analyzed actively in connection with its upcoming ratification. The majority of Soviet specialists believe that the treaty was drawn up on the basis of regard for mutual interests, sensible compromises, and the sides' identical security and that it is balanced, removes disproportions, and eliminates potential for carrying out a surprise attack and for launching large-scale offensive operations in Europe. All this, in our view, accords with reality in principle.

But what do Western experts think? In their assessments they unequivocally tend to think that the signed treaty is of greater benefit to the NATO countries, since all their demands have been achieved in full and this is precisely the result that the West had been persistently seeking. They emphasize that the USSR is eliminating more arms and that the correlation of military forces following the cuts will change in favor of the North Atlantic alliance, while the unprecedented monitoring and notification measures will enable it to assess the Soviet Armed Forces "as from an open book." They consider the resolution of the following questions a victory for Western diplomacy: the inclusion of paramilitary formations (troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the KGB; and the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy) in the overall arms levels; the limiting of land-based naval aircraft, regardless of carrier-based aircraft; the NATO countries' securing of the opportunity—to reach the ceiling of 6,800 combat aircraft—not only not to destroy a single aircraft but even to increase their numbers to the restricted level.

What objections can be made to such assessments? We really are reducing more ground-based arms, since we have more of them. Verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty really will be unprecedented, but in equal measure for both sides. The correlation of ground-based military forces between the USSR and NATO after the reductions will be roughly 1.5:1 in NATO's favor (1.5 to 1 for tanks, combat armored vehicles, and artillery and 1.3:1 for combat aircraft and attack helicopters). Some people believe that NATO's 50-percent superiority supposedly "does not run counter to the criterion of minimum sufficiency for defense, proceeding from our defensive doctrine."

Such statements are, to put it mildly, far from the truth, as scientific criteria for minimum sufficiency have not yet been formulated. Therefore there is no point in consolidating an asymmetrical arms reduction by means of farfetched criteria and giving out big advances in the disarmament process. It would be more correct to reckon that the national levels of conventional arms set for our

country in the signed treaty, combined with a strong nuclear shield, ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of defensive tasks under any conditions of the situation.

Nonetheless, why did we agree to conclude a treaty requiring a greater arms reduction by us? We did so because the treaty generally accords with our strategic policy of relieving Europe of a huge quantity of arms, dismantling everything that the "cold war" piled up, and creating on a new basis a system of collective security that is equal for all. Chiefly it was for lightening our own military burden, helping the country to extricate itself from the economic crisis, and raising Soviet people's living and everyday conditions.

Are we achieving these aims? I believe we are. The economic and social consequences of the treaty will be very great. It is hard at present to name the real benefits. But there is no need to doubt that they will be weighty. The military map of Europe will change. Very soon it will look quite different from what it was two or three years ago: from the viewpoint of the number of troops, their structure and location, the creation of groupings, the intensity of combat training, and so forth. Under these new conditions the Treaty on Conventional Forces in no way infringes our security. Its ratification and practical realization are advantageous to everyone, as a real material basis is created for improving the situation on the continent and in the world as a whole.

The current attempts by certain countries, owing to a discrepant understanding of Article III of the treaty (rules for counting), to suspend its ratification and to slow down the further advance of the disarmament process have been occasioned not by some unilateral actions or interpretations by the Soviet Union. The deep-down reasons lie elsewhere—in the categorical refusal of the United States and NATO to take appropriate steps in the sphere of reducing naval arms and in the desire to make us—to compel us to—agree to an unjust position which runs counter to our interests. We are ready to seek solutions. Our compromise proposal on this score has been conveyed to the U.S. side. Will there be a constructive response to it and then ratification will take place, or will the signed Paris treaty become a hostage of Washington?

As regards our security, it is reliably ensured and is determined by the Soviet Union's immutable foreign policy course, including in the disarmament sphere. The guarantee of this is the reform of the Soviet Armed Forces, their transfer to a new qualitative condition, and the imparting of a new look to them on the basis of sufficiency for the country's defense.

Military Denies Naval Forces Are CFE Obstacle

LD0804125191 Moscow TASS in English 1216 GMT
8 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, April 8 (TASS)—"Certain forces, seeking to gain as many unilateral military advantages as

possible from the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), are laying new claims on the Soviet Union," Colonel Georgiy Paladyuk, staff member of the Legal Treaty Department of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, told TASS.

He spoke in connection with the publication of a report in the Czechoslovak newspaper HOSPODARSKE NOVINY by Colonel Jiri Divis, deputy head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces' General Staff.

According to the newspaper, Divis said that "armaments of the Soviet Marines have become a stumbling block on the way to the CFE treaty ratification".

Colonel Paladyuk, participant in the Vienna talks on disarmament issues, refuted Divis' statement as "absolutely unfounded". He recalled that naval forces had been excluded from the negotiations by the mandate of the talks signed by all negotiators. "This was insisted upon by the United States and its NATO allies, not by the Soviet Union," Paladyuk said.

He maintains that the marine units in question had been formed during the Soviet Armed Forces' change-over to a defensive doctrine to protect the country's sea coasts. "This was done before the CFE treaty was signed and it was not a secret," Paladyuk pointed out.

Speaking about the transfer of some armaments from the European part of the Soviet Union to beyond the Urals, Paladyuk emphasised that the European public had been informed in advance about these steps.

Troop Withdrawal From Poland Begins 9 April

LD0904101391 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1954 GMT 8 Apr 91

[By TASS special correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Borne-Sulinowo (Koszalin Voivodship), 8 April (TASS)—"I want to stress that the process of bringing Soviet troops home from the Republic of Poland would have begun this spring in any event, even if the Polish Government had not addressed such a request to us. In accordance with the defensive doctrine adopted in the USSR, Soviet troops will not be stationed on the territories of other states," Colonel General Viktor Dubinin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, representative of the USSR Government on the sojourn of Soviet troops in the Republic of Poland, stated this today at a news conference in the Soviet military garrison in Borne-Sulinowo (Koszalin voivodship), dedicated to the start of the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of Poland.

On 9 April we are starting the withdrawal of units and subunits planned for this year, he stressed, without waiting for the presidential summit meeting of our two

countries, and even in the absence of a treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. We are starting the troop withdrawal with heavy weaponry. A Guards rocket brigade is leaving for the USSR on that day in full complement. During 1991, a number of units and subunits of aviation, communications, and engineering troops will be withdrawn from Poland, as well as, at the request of the Polish Government, individual tank and artillery subunits, the total number of which will amount to more than 10,000 men. Seven Soviet military settlements with all buildings—hostels, schools, hospitals, and so forth—will be handed over to the Polish side.

The commander of the Northern Group of Forces especially emphasized the fact that this action has been undertaken by accord between the Government of Poland and the USSR, and the final schedules for withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the Republic of Poland will be agreed upon during Polish President Lech Walesa's visit to Moscow.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Tactical Weapons Cut Urged in Europe

PM2803145991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

["Viewpoint" by Professor Major General V. Larionov:
"We Must Go Further"]

[Text] It is my belief that perennial talks on "minimum nuclear deterrence" can only distract Europeans from finding a constructive solution to this complex question. After all, on top of everything there is still no generally recognized understanding of what "minimum nuclear deterrence" is. Why minimum? Deterrence should be highly reliable and secure. It would obviously be more accurate to talk about the minimum quantity of nuclear weapons needed to be retained to guarantee maximum deterrence of war.

Nevertheless many West European analysts and politicians still ascribe this role to tactical nuclear weapons. Some advocate retaining this class of arms in the future as a stabilizing factor. They put forward the following idea: Removing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe means automatically increasing the likelihood of unleashing, if not provoking, a conventional war in Europe.

This idea might perhaps still have attracted attention 10 years ago. But in today's Europe it is already an anachronism. Few people today fail to realize that unleashing a conventional war—irrespective of what and who provokes it—is suicidal per se. In short, a conventional war itself or, more correctly, the predicted consequences of such a war for Europe and the world as a whole act as the deterrent. If we are talking about deterring war in earnest, strategic nuclear weapons probably perform this role far more effectively and reliably.

There are also claims that tactical nuclear weapons maintain the political prestige of "small" nuclear powers that are unable to compete with the nuclear hegemonies. If these weapons are eliminated, there will be extremely palpable political dependence (Britain and France, for instance) on USSR-U.S. accords. In my view, these arguments result from the confrontational thinking of past years.

I believe that the idea of the deterrent (stabilizing) role played by tactical nuclear weapons is clearly bankrupt both from the military and the political viewpoints. Speaking about their role, I must point out that they are the most destabilizing and provocative of all types of mass-destruction weapons.

First, when talking about tactical nuclear weapons we must bear in mind that today this term also includes operational-tactical weapons, that is, weapons that perform tasks in the interests of operations.

Second, compared with strategic weapons, tactical and operational-tactical weapons are not bound to stationary positions and are more mobile. Consequently, it is harder to trace and monitor their movements.

Third, these weapons are usually found in areas controlled by army commanders and corps and even division commanders. This weakens central supreme command control over their use.

In my view, the role and status of European tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons will change with Europe's advance along the path of further cuts in conventional arms and confidence-building. Their importance is being devalued still further and the question of completely eliminating this class of arms will become a practical reality.

Admittedly, to be realistic, I foresee heated diplomatic battles to preserve U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. I think that there can be only two decisions here: Either Europe is rendered a nuclear-free zone from the Atlantic to the Urals, or there are cuts in the fixed contingent of U.S. conventional forces with a minimum—also fixed—number of nuclear warheads in the U.S. forces and in the forces of the Soviet Union's European military districts.

A U.S. tactical nuclear counterbalance to Soviet might may in time be the only justification for retaining the U.S. military presence on the European continent. I think that the current stance held by some West European powers as regards "minimum nuclear deterrence" is based on precisely that prospect.

I agree that the process of eliminating nuclear weapons in the European theater is not a one-act or simple process. An overall ceiling of 500 delivery vehicles (or warheads) could probably be established in the initial stages, as a result of appropriate accords, with this quota allocated as follows: 100 each for the United States, Britain, and France, and 200 for the USSR. That would be a major step toward nuclear disarmament as a whole.

Within the agreed quotas those structures that have taken shape in various countries could be cut back as a whole. For the USSR that would mean operational-tactical ballistic missiles and for the United States tactical nuclear-capable naval and air force strike aviation, and so on. Securing an agreement banning the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons (particularly the Lance nuclear missiles) is extremely desirable in this context.

A change in the system of European nuclear weapons' subordination could be another step toward reaching an agreement on cutting back and eliminating European nuclear weapons. That is, all countries should withdraw these weapons from the structure of their general-purpose forces and hand them over directly to the supreme military and political leadership, as is the case with strategic nuclear forces. This step would enhance the real guarantees of nonuse of tactical nuclear weapons.

In a word, the phased destruction of tactical nuclear weapons would be a weighty contribution to the general disarmament process.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Sino-Soviet Talks on Border Troop Cuts Begin

LD0504101591 Moscow TASS in English 1003 GMT
5 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow, April 5 (TASS)—A new round of Sino-Soviet negotiations on mutual reduction of troops and the building up of confidence in the military sphere in the border area opened here today. The sides will continue the substantive discussion of the issues linked with the topic of the negotiations.

The Soviet delegation is led by G.V. Kireev, ambassador at large of the USSR Foreign Ministry; the Chinese delegation is led by Liu Guangzhi, deputy head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's USSR and East European affairs department.

UN Associations View Asian-Pacific Security Problems

Conference Opens in Vladivostok

PM0704153191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 4 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "On the Agenda—Mutual Understanding"]

[Text] Vladivostok—Issues of security in the Asia-Pacific region and possibilities for reducing the tension between the major states are being discussed at a quadrilateral meeting of the UN Associations of the USSR, the PRC, Japan, and the United States opening in Vladivostok.

The agenda includes global topics such as the effect of political and strategic changes in USSR and U.S. foreign policy on stability in the region and the growing role of Japan and China in this. Issues of the development of missile weapons inside and outside the Asia-Pacific region and their nonproliferation on the Korean peninsula will also be discussed, and arms control measures in Asia will be analyzed in the light of the change in East-West relations.

The special importance of this meeting being held in Vladivostok on the eve of the Soviet-Japanese summit was noted by the head of the Japanese delegation, Professor Masashi Nishihara of the National Defense Academy Social Sciences Department. The neighbor countries, he believes, must achieve greater mutual understanding in the military respect and must have precise and trustworthy information about this.

Conference Ends

LD0504190991 Moscow TASS in English 1757 GMT
5 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Vadim Klementyev]

[Text] Vladivostok, April 5 (TASS)—The situation in the Korean peninsula, the lowering of military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region were discussed by a meeting of the United Nations associations of the Soviet Union, the United States, China and Japan. The meeting of U.N. associations on problems of security in the Asia-Pacific region ended here today. Head of the U.S. delegation, former defence secretary and former assistant to the president for national security affairs Frank Carlucci said that such a meeting would have been unthinkable seven or eight years ago.

Carlucci said that although differences on a number of questions persisted, the similarity of views was being formed in such debates.

Heads and participants in all delegation interviewed by TASS said that fragments of ice of the cold war are melting albeit slowly.

Professor Masashi Nishihara from Social Sciences Department of Japan's Defence Agency believes that the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and in Europe can change for the better sooner, and that the potential of goodneighbourly political, economic and other contacts between Japan and the USSR are yet to be tapped. Peoples should discard outdated approaches to international politics before they usher in the 21st century.

Head of Chinese delegation Shi Xia, deputy director of Institute of Strategic Studies, expressed satisfaction over the fact that the attitudes of the Soviet and Chinese delegations coincide on most of the important problems and that new principles and forms of communication emerge in the Asia-Pacific region. This will be promoted also by a new high level meeting of Soviet and Chinese leaders.

Soviet delegates, specifically ambassador at large of the USSR Foreign Ministry Vladimir Fedotov, expressed the confidence that the meeting of representatives of the United Nations associations will promote the further improvement of the climate in international relations. There are plans to hold such meetings in Beijing and Tokyo.

The message of the Russian foreign minister to the meeting was read out. "Our purposes and goals are peaceful. We have no claims of military, territorial or ideological nature," the statement says. "In this context sovereign Russia intends to exert efforts independently or in the framework of the renewed union to help turn the Asia-Pacific region into a zone of stability, dialogue and all-round cooperation. We favour excluding the region from the sphere of military rivalry. We are for building up confidence, for political settlement of all disputed questions, broad and unhampered development of ties in the areas of trade, environmental protection, culture and human contacts," the document says.

Japanese Expectations on Far East Troop Cuts Viewed

*OW0804115891 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1000 GMT 7 Apr 91*

[Kalin commentary]

[Text] According to a report by KYODO, the Defense Agency of Japan appears to expect that President Gorbachev's upcoming visit will result in a drastic reduction in Soviet troops in the Far East. In this connection, Moscow Radio military commentator Kalin writes as follows:

As evident in the report, the Defense Agency appears to see the drastic reduction in Soviet troops in the Far East as one of the conditions necessary to improve Japanese-Soviet relations and ensure the security of the Asian and Pacific region. The Japanese military believes that the Soviet troops in the Far East maintain greater military strength than their defense requirements. For example, Mr. Sadakuyama of the Defense Agency recently said that the Soviet military threat has hampered improvement Japanese-Soviet relations and the insurance of security in the Asian and Pacific region. I cannot but question this. As listeners know, the words of the Soviet threat were deleted from the 1990 Japanese Defense White Paper. Former [as heard] Defense Agency

Director General Ikeda, in his inaugural address, confirmed that there was no military threat by the Soviet Union to Japan. To my surprise, however, voices diametrically opposed to this are heard in the Defense Agency. Notwithstanding, I do not want to rebut the argument for the Soviet threat to Japan. That is because the question itself of whether the Soviet Union poses a military threat to Japan is groundless, not because there are no Soviet arguments against it.

NEWSWEEK, an American weekly, in its 1 April edition, carried the results of a poll, which are of great interest to me. According to the results, three-quarters of the Americans polled saw Japanese military power as more threatening to the United States than Soviet military power. How is the Soviet Union, which shares its border with Japan and maintains no alliance, to deal with this question? Hence, it has become necessary to debate the question of strong Japanese military power. I think it would be far better to leave out this question than to strive to find ways to resolve it. I believe it is rather urgent for Japan and the Soviet Union to take measures to build each other's confidence in the military area. In this regard, the Soviet side made appropriate proposals to the Japanese last autumn. In the proposals, the Soviet Union asked that top leaders of the two countries announce that they do not see each other as a hostile nation. However, Japan has thus far made no concrete response to the proposals. As seen in the KYODO report, Japan appears to have no intention of establishing any military ties with the Soviet Union. For example, Mr. Fujishima of the Defense Agency took the view that the question of establishing military ties between the two countries should be linked to the solution of the territorial issue, the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the solution of other issues pending between two countries. I do not believe that this linkage is the best idea. I believe that, since the two countries are unable to resolve all the issues pending between them, it is necessary for them to make a phased move toward the establishment of military ties. I believe the strengthened confidence between Japan and the Soviet Union in the military area will stimulate disarmament.

President Gorbachev will certainly make new proposals on relaxing military tension between the two countries when he visits Japan. I believe the military tension cannot be relaxed by unilateral efforts. Joint efforts, with mutual interests in mind, can rather carry out the important task of relaxing tension.

This has been a commentary on relaxing military tension between Japan and the Soviet Union.

FRANCE

Defense Aide on New Role as Arms Export Controller

91P20286A Paris *LIBERATION* in French
23-24 Mar 91 p 7

[Interview with Gerard Renon, secretary of state for defense, by Jean Guisnel; place and date not given: "Arms Sales: 'To Forbid Is a Mistaken Idea'"]

[Text] [Guisnel] Pierre Joxe has just entrusted you with the control of arms exports. In his letter, he specified that "a relevant policy adapted to the new international environment must be determined." Does this augur a recasting of the French system for military materiel sales?

[Renon] Things should never be considered immutable: Pierre Joxe and I are convinced of that. The world, the techniques, the materiel evolve, as does the configuration of the threat. Today, it is possible to view our system of controls as good, rigorous, and vigilant at the technical level. If the French system is compared to the others, our country apparently uses particularly good tools to avoid untimely exports.

[Guisnel] A Luchaire affair is no longer possible?

[Renon] I note that this kind of business has not happened in many years. The control procedures of CIEEMG (Interministerial Commission for the Study of War Materiel Exports) have been revised and they are much more efficient. Obviously, the responsible services cannot fall asleep on the job. Other attempts at skirting the procedures cannot be excluded in the future, but our system has been functioning without a snag for quite some time.

[Guisnel] You are talking about the technical conditions for controlling arms. However, aren't the political questions the most serious? French industrialists had all the necessary authorizations to overarm Saddam Husayn....

[Renon] A whole gamut of opinions can be gathered when it comes to principles, which does not mean that it is legitimate to overarm oneself.... The supplier must determine when weapons become excessive. It is very difficult to take into account all of the parameters that determine this threshold: They require analyses of the country itself, of its neighbors, of its regional relations. This is a synthesis of a political nature but it is not easy: In the case of Iraq, it can be noted that an evaluation may be justified in a given situation and that other problems emerge later.

[Guisnel] Don't such evolutions entail reflexions that are more international than national?

[Renon] Undoubtedly, dialogues between all the exporting countries will be indispensable to define common attitudes. However, it is not possible to have

exclusively discussions among exporters. Importing countries must also participate, as the chief of state emphasized on 3 March.

[Guisnel] All of the weapons do not present the same level of danger. What measures would be necessary to control the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons?

[Renon] As for nuclear weapons, control mechanisms already exist and we participate in them very strictly. Our country has decided not to use, not to possess, and not to manufacture chemical weapons; therefore, we do not export any and we impose very close controls on the products or technologies that make it possible to manufacture them. This is a difficult subject: In this field, manufacturing materials are widely available and restrictions will only be efficient if many countries adhere to them.... You know that France plays a primary role in this field, since Paris was the venue for the conference on chemical disarmament at the beginning of 1989. We shall continue to labor in this direction.

[Guisnel] The most significant progress has been accomplished in the ballistic field.

[Renon] It is true, including very recently: 16 countries are participating in missile technology control (accord signed in 1987 by France, the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Canada). In Tokyo, two days ago, the partners decided both to expand the list of the technologies included in this nonproliferation agreement and to call on the other states to sign it.

[Guisnel] Isn't your optimism tempered by the fact that the USSR has not signed the document?

[Renon] Indeed, it is extremely important that the USSR participate in this movement for the system to be totally efficient. However, I note that Moscow is maintaining a vigilant attitude on nuclear proliferation.

[Guisnel] Won't you experience some difficulties in separating your new role of supercontroller from that of VPR [expansion unknown], to which industrialists would generally like to restrict the members of the government?

[Renon] The job of trade representative belongs only to the industrialists. This is not government work. Naturally, the state is variously concerned with arms sales, primarily because customers are also states. They wish to make sure that suppliers enjoy the trust of their government. In addition, customers generally would like to know the opinion of our Armed Forces on the weapons that are being proposed to them, and they often seek the support of state services on training, quality control, etc. I am taking on this state role, not that of trade delegate.

GERMANY

Liaison Officer on Withdrawal of Soviet Troops

AU3003165391 Berlin DER MORGEN in German
26 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Major General Hartmut Foertsch by Oliver Michalsky; place and date not given: "I Think That This Will Be Very Expensive"]

[Text] Hartmut Foertsch, born in 1936, is the most important man between the Federal Government and the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces. Since 3 October 1990, he has headed the German Liaison Detachment in Strausberg, which is responsible for contact with the Soviet Armed Forces, and worked as the government representative for the troop withdrawal.

[Michalsky] General, 100,000 soldiers are to be withdrawn from Germany in 1991. The first quarter is now coming to an end. Have 25,000 soldiers been removed?

[Foertsch] Fewer than 25,000 have departed for the Soviet Union. However, the timetable is very flexible. Thus, from the current slight delay one cannot draw the conclusion that the goal for 1991 might not be achieved. The most significant withdrawal was scheduled to take place in the first and third quarters of 1991. In the second and fourth quarters we have more leeway. I proceed from the assumption that, once the differences between the Soviet Union and Poland concerning transit are settled, the Soviet Armed Forces will no longer have problems leaving Germany according to schedule.

[Michalsky] What actual delays were caused by the Soviet-Polish dissonances?

[Foertsch] That cannot be determined by figures because the Soviet side is currently flying home most of its troops. That is the alternative to transportation by rail. It is not possible for us to control exactly how many Soviet soldiers are flown to the Soviet Union. We are relying on information from the Soviet Armed Forces.

[Michalsky] Are there inspectors who check the withdrawal by land?

[Foertsch] No. That is not stipulated in the agreement. However, we count the Soviet major items of equipment that are transported by ship. The same applies to transportation by rail.

[Michalsky] How many ships depart from Mukran and Rostock every week?

[Foertsch] Currently four ferries run between Mukran and Memel. One journey lasts 60 hours. The loading capacity from Mukran is 104 freight cars per ferry.

[Michalsky] Major General Stepanov, who is responsible for construction issues in the Western Group, wants over

10 billion German marks [DM] for the return of real estate that was used by the Soviet troops. Is that a bad joke?

[Foertsch] I have heard about that. It is true that the Soviet side wants to sell the buildings that it constructed and make a profit. The money is intended to be used to provide housing for officers returning to the Soviet Union.

The problem is that the Soviet side claims that it built halls for motor vehicles and dining halls in the barracks with its own financial means. When giving back the barracks to the finance minister, the Soviets would like the investments that are valuable for them refunded—irrespective of the depreciation.

[Michalsky] That is a rather naive demand.

[Foertsch] If somebody wants to buy the motor vehicle hall he would have to buy the whole barracks. Otherwise he will not get the hall either.

With the DM7.8 billion granted by the Bonn government so far, the Soviet Union can build 33,000 to 36,000 apartments. However, it needs 55,000 apartments to be able to provide housing for the returning officers. The missing apartments are supposed to be financed with such profits.

[Michalsky] Does that demand burden your relations with the Western Group?

[Foertsch] No. If I wanted to buy a plot of land, for example, I would first offer DM12 per square meter. Negotiations will show how realistic the demands are. Anyway, DM10 billion is completely unrealistic in my view.

[Michalsky] In what condition is the Soviet property to be left behind?

[Foertsch] One cannot generalize. There are a number of barracks that make a good impression from the outside. The quality of the building stock depends on the age of the buildings. If the houses were to be renovated, only the outer walls could be saved in many cases. Everything else would have to be newly built. There are also buildings that were constructed by the Western Group over the past 40 years. According to my knowledge, they do not conform to German regulations. The authorities will probably not authorize the use of those buildings. However, the biggest problems that we will have to overcome are linked with the environmental burdens that we have inherited.

[Michalsky] What problems are they?

[Foertsch] For instance, problems related to the redevelopment of the soil and the disposal of old oil, gasoline, old ammunition, and garbage. I assume that once the Munich-based company running industrial enterprises and facilities has taken stock, we will get initial cost estimates. I think it will cost a lot of money.

[Michalsky] Who will foot the bill? It seems to be totally unrealistic to assume that the Soviets will pay for all the damage done.

[Foertsch] The politicians will decide what is totally unrealistic. For the time being, we assume that an account will be rendered on the existing assets versus the costs of the necessary redevelopment and disposal. That is laid out in the treaty.

[Michalsky] Is there a possibility of conducting unannounced inspections?

[Foertsch] No. On principle, that will be coordinated with the Soviet side.

[Michalsky] Doesn't that imply the danger of things being hushed up?

[Foertsch] I do not think anything can be hushed up. After all, we not only take samples of the soil, but we also measure the air pollution. Nor can the Soviets have an interest in hushing things up because they would have to pay tomorrow for what they hushed up today. For instance, we asked the Soviet side to deal with household garbage more carefully, because we will find every hidden dumping place by means of infrared analyses.

[Michalsky] Outside the barracks, many Soviet families are accommodated in apartment houses. Can those buildings be used again as soon as they move out?

[Foertsch] Certainly not. First of all, basic repairs will have to be done. In some cases, the costs of such repairs will be higher than those of a new building; that will make it easier for us to decide.

[Michalsky] Does the Bundeswehr have an interest in taking over Soviet barracks?

[Foertsch] I do not think so, unless there is an exceptional case where it seems to be sensible.

[Michalsky] The Federal Government pays DM250 million for the troop withdrawal every year. Who gets the money, and what is it spent on?

[Foertsch] The transport minister is authorized to dispose of the money which he shifts to cover the costs in connection with the use of rail, sea lanes, and roads to the Soviet border. So there are transport costs.

[Michalsky] The commissioners in charge of the withdrawal with the Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania land governments have apparently discovered possibilities of handling the withdrawal from their laender faster than scheduled by the Soviets. That seems to indicate that the Soviets have deliberately created certain time reserves....

[Foertsch] No. They only pull out of the capitals of the laender ahead of schedule to allow the authorities to develop the infrastructure of the respective seats of government faster. The withdrawal schedule is laid out

in such a flexible manner that the goal will even be reached even in the event of frictions caused by this immense troop movement.

[Michalsky] The Soviet troops that will be transported across the Baltic Sea to Klaipeda, formerly Memel, will come into a crisis area. Are you sure that they will not be put into action against the independence movements there? Will that be checked by the German side?

[Foertsch] That is a purely political problem for which I am not responsible. I can only say that primarily, material will be shipped to Memel by sea because the ferryboats do not have sufficient sea rescue packages, which are a prerequisite for large-scale passenger transports.

[Michalsky] In what way is the Soviet Forces Western Group holding its maneuvers?

[Foertsch] Under the treaty, a maximum number of 13,000 men can take part in an exercise. Maneuvers are now held in training areas, not in the open country.

[Michalsky] General Snetkov, who was supreme commander for many years, was replaced by General Burlakov. You have dealt with both military officials. In what way do the two differ from each other?

[Foertsch] Strictly speaking, I have not dealt with both. I have primarily dealt with Gen Burlakov. Gen Snetkov made it difficult for me to contact him. For instance, I did not have an opportunity to pay him a first visit. Burlakov gave me such an opportunity very, very quickly. It is not my business to assess persons. However, Gen Burlakov is, of course, very experienced in the withdrawal of troops, because he was in charge of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary. I think that such professional cooperation is a good opportunity to fulfill our task by mutual agreement and in accordance with the treaty.

Government Report on Illegal Arms Exports

*AU0204155991 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG
in German 31 Mar 91 pp 1-2*

[Heinz Vielain report: "Germans Received 7.5 Million for Poison Gas"]

[Text] Bonn—The FRG's foreign relations were "considerably disturbed" by the participation of German companies in Iraqi poison gas production. This was stated in a current internal report of the FRG Government on illegal arms exports. The report says that several foreign governments have made demarches in Bonn.

The report, which has become known to WELT AM SONNTAG, refers to the activities of the Karl Kolb GmbH, Pilot Plant GmbH, and WET GmbH companies.

The Darmstadt public prosecutor's office has in the meantime issued indictments against 11 employees of these companies. Among them are also former managers of the Preussag concern.

According to the government report, during their investigations experts found out that parts of facilities, which were delivered illegally, were especially constructed for the production of projectiles, bombs, and missiles with poison gas.

Years ago Iraq made preparations for a poison gas facility in Samarra. From 1984 to 1987 four facilities for the production of chemical weapons are said to have been constructed with German help, for which Iraq paid about 7.5 million German marks [DM].

According to the investigations, the facilities were adapted by the Pilot Plant in Germany especially for the production of chemical combat agents (lewisite and tabun).

WET GmbH, which was founded by former employees of Preussag, reportedly brought a facility to Iraq, which was especially constructed for the assembly of 122-mm missiles. The former Preussag employees who worked in the "Middle East Region" subdepartment of Preussag are accused of having illegally exported an assembly line for the production of bombs, at a value of about DM3.2 million, and specially constructed cooling containers in the filling of chemical combat agents.

According to the FRG Government's internal report, Bonn was told by the U.S. Administration as early as at the beginning of 1984 that Iraq is "implementing a chemical weapons program" and had ordered from the Kolb company the equipment for testing and production facilities for the production of nerve gas. In March 1984 the matter was examined, but this did not bring about any confirmation of the suspicion.

The government report points out that the United States and, in particular, also Israel continued to be convinced of the participation of German companies in Iraq's poison gas production. They repeatedly briefed Bonn on available findings. As a result, the export of parts of facilities that are suited for the production of poison gas but that have not been especially constructed for this purpose was made subject to permission.

The report says that in October 1984 two German engineers visited the premises in Samarra. The two engineers came to the conclusion that the production of combat agents is "unlikely."

According to the government report, as late as in 1987 investigations were started against those responsible in the Karl Kolb, Pilot Plant, WET, and Preussag companies. Searches were made in the companies and in the apartments of a total of 29 persons. Comprehensive evidence was found during these searches.

The government report also deals with the potential participation of German companies in Iraq's armament

in the conventional field. The issue is, in particular, a factory for cannon barrels in Taji, 30 km northwest of Baghdad. There are indications that large-caliber cannon barrels and, perhaps, also other parts of weapons were produced there with German help.

In total, 20 companies from the FRG are said to have worked there. In this connection the Bochum public prosecutor's office is also investigating five renowned large industrial companies: Kloeckner, Ferrostahl, Schloemann-Siemag, SMS Hasenclever, and Thyssen. Searches have already been made in some subcontractor companies.

According to the FRG Government's report, there is also a suspicion that German companies are involved in the Iraqi "Saad 16" project. This deals with the construction of a defense technology center in which Iraq wants to develop—according to the latest findings—missiles and planes for military use and other armament materiel.

According to information obtained by the FRG Government, the German company Gildemeister was the general agent and Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm was the most important German subcontractor. Equipment was also delivered directly from the United States.

German companies might also have been involved in the development of a high-altitude reconnaissance plane and a mobile air-based radar system for Iraq.

However, German companies were obviously not involved in extending the range of Iraqi Scud missiles from 650 to 900 km.

The report says: "Initial investigations of the Scud-B missiles fired on Israel have shown, according to Israeli sources and contrary to the assumptions spread by the media, that they do not contain any parts from German or other Western companies. The type and quality of the modifications indicate that the changes were made by the Iraqis themselves and not by Western experts."

Details of Ministry Report on Arms Sales to Iraq

AU0804195491 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
8 Apr 91 pp 28-29

[Unattributed report: "Supplies for Saddam"]

[Text] Economics Minister Moellemann made gloomy remarks at a session of the Presidium of the Free Democratic Party of Germany [FDP]. "Some of the former economics ministers do not appear in a good light," he stated when arms exports to Iraq were discussed.

He did not mention any names. However, it was clear to the FDP Presidium who the new minister who wants to do better than everybody else was thinking of: His predecessors Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Martin Bangemann, and Helmut Haussmann, who are members of the FDP.

Moellemann knows what he is talking about. The Economics Committee of the Bundestag has had in hand a report compiled by the Economics Ministry on German weapons exports to Iraq since Easter. The document that comprises 64 pages ("classified document kept secret for official reasons") shows that both legal and illegal exports of weapons and armaments to the regime of Saddam Husayn flourished under his liberal predecessors. Benevolent approval practices and lax controls by the Economics Ministry and the Federal Office for Industry (BAW), of which the former is in charge, made things easy for the death merchants. Renowned German concerns and smaller enterprises deceived the government's control organs regularly with hair-raising tricks.

The document seemed so explosive to all parties concerned that it was immediately declared confidential. Only members of the Economics Committee were allowed to read the document but were supervised. The people's representatives were not permitted to make notes, let alone photocopy the document.

"Everyone who receives the report is especially obliged to maintain confidentiality," the economics minister told Friedhelm Ost, the chairman of the Economics Committee and former spokesman for Chancellor Kohl, in a letter. Otherwise current investigations and the reputation of innocent companies would be endangered. However, it is probably the reputation of Bonn politicians that might be affected. There is hardly any evidence of Moellemann's obligatory positive statements ("The government's approval practices for weapons exports to the Near and Middle East region were particularly restrictive.") in the report. Quite the contrary: Bonn permitted weapons exports worth 1.3 billion German marks [DM] to Saddam. The exports included pistols and ammunition, explosives and radio equipment, radar devices and computers, machinery and vehicles.

What is particularly embarrassing is that exports to Iraq carried out under Section D of the export list and totaling DM3.9 million were approved as recently as in 1990—for chemical plants and chemicals that "are suitable for the production and disposal of chemical warfare agents," according to the definition of the BAW. Thus, German industry possibly supplied material for Saddam's poison gas plants.

The most important item on Moellemann's official export list does not appear as a West German delivery: Worldwide sought-after German-French productions such as the "Roland" antiaircraft missile and the "Hot" and "Milan" antitank systems were supplied to Iraq through the French "Euromissile" company. According to the German partner Mersers Schmidt-Boelkow-Blohm, a total of 19,870 missiles were involved.

The trick is very simple: In a government agreement concluded in 1972 Bonn and Paris agreed to interpret and apply their countries' weapons export law "in the spirit of German-French cooperation." Under SPD

[Social Democratic Party of Germany] Chancellor Helmut Schmidt the Federal Government stipulated in 1982 that German parts for "Roland," "Hot," and "Milan" that were incorporated in the weapon in France "will be treated as goods of French origin." They simply turned into French parts that are not subject to German export control. Thus, German consciousness remained unburdened.

If ministers and state secretaries "gave priority to cooperation interests" over exports controls (Moellemann report), it is not surprising that government representatives in authority were rather generous. The BAW issued clearance certificates ("negative certificates") for weapons exports quite easily under Economics Ministers Lambsdorff, Bangemann, and Haussmann.

A particularly embarrassing example mentioned in the report shows where that practice led: In November 1989 Greens Deputy Vera Vennegarts asked the government about alleged export permits: The Ferrostaal company allegedly received permission to export a gun factory to Tadjik. The government immediately denied everything.

However, officials in the Economics Ministry finally had a suspicion. They compared all the negative certifications that they had generously issued for Ferrostaal. What they discovered suggested that the smart businessmen had split up a deal that was subject to permission into individual parts that were not subject to permission.

Now that they had awakened, the officials got the idea that the Thyssen concern had deceived them as well. Thyssen applied for the export of a similar plant—also in Tadjik—in 1989, during Haussmann's term of office. The mere affirmation by Thyssen officials that the plant was not built for specifically military purposes was sufficient for the BAW to grant the required permission, the report says. Meanwhile, the controllers "have gathered evidence that speaks against the civilian use of the plant and for its use for the production of guns."

It has turned out that the credulous BAW officials had bad luck with the Thyssen Maschinenbau company as well. The company concluded a contract with Iraq to deliver turbo pumps and applied for a negative certification. By June 1990 it had begun to dawn on the BAW officials that the certification "may have been obtained through false indications and the presentation of modified documents."

This is a mild formulation. The Thyssen officials blackened parts of the documents needed for the application, without the BAW noticing it. Moellemann's report stresses. The Federal Office of Criminal Investigation made the writing visible again. "Fuel" and "oxidizer" were supposed to flow through the Thyssen pumps. "That made it clear that the turbo pump units in question were especially constructed for use in missiles," the report reads.

According to the report, sloppiness in Lambsdorff's Economics Ministry was to blame for the fact that Saddam was able to work unimpeded on his "Saad 16" development center for many years. The general contractor, the Bielefeld-based Gildemeister Projekta company, received several negative certifications from 1983 onwards and a total of 52 export permits during Lambsdorff's and Bangemann's terms in office. The simple assertion that a research project of Mosul University was involved was sufficient. It was only in 1987 that Bonn woke up and refused to grant further permits.

As a matter of fact, as early as in 1982 the Economics Ministry received hints that "Saad 16" was to become a military facility and that Gildemeister wanted to participate. Moellemann's report refers to the sloppiness during the term of Lambsdorff, who is now FDP chairman, in the following way: "This early correspondence was not available to the BAW for examinations in the years 1983-85."

What happened in connection with the granting of export permits makes one thing clear: The government's arms export controllers did not carry out strict controls until—mostly foreign—secret services suggested that something was wrong with their customers. The Federal Government did not act before damage was caused.

Moellemann has now announced tough measures against shady export deals. Bonn has received 137 hints that FRG companies allegedly violated the UN embargo against Iraq. According to the secret report, legal investigations have been started against the Tellkamp Engineering company in Muehlheim, for example, because it is suspected of having supplied artillery ammunition to Iraq.

Minor offenses were also discovered in the course of investigations. A company from Hannover, for example, is facing monetary fine proceedings. It allegedly planned to sell an "industrial vacuum cleaner worth DM10,000" to Iraq despite the embargo.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

6 May 1991